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CHAPrKR I.

New England Opposition to the War of 1812
The unrelenting efforts of the New England states to prevent

.....

the national government from entering into a war against England in
1812, and their determined efforts to secure peace once the war had. bePIl, culminated. in the Hartford Convention ... This celebrated convention,
though rendered ineffectual by the TreatT or Ghent, had an outcome totallT unexpected bT it. Federalist constituents, which turned the rest of
the count17 against the t treasonable t lathering and resulted in the 111timate down.tall of the Federalist partT_
The reasons for the declaration of war primarily &trected the
New England states, and theT resented the administration which insisted
upon avenging their interests against their will, starting its punishment

..

or England by an embargo that throttled. the commerce of the eastern states
and exposed their people to extreme privation. The administration further
alienated the New England states bT favoring the French government against
the English, and of the two countries the New En&1anders distinctlT considered. France the more ofrensive to their commerce. The Berlin and Milan
Decrees of Napoleon, proaulgated in December, 1806, had declared Britain
to be in a state or blockade, and in August, 1807, it was announced'that
the vessels of neutral

~erica

would be seized for violations. This,

coupled with the French restrictions on trade with her col.nies, was more
1

2

.bn.xi...s t. the New Englan.ers than the British blockades, apr.ssments,
or Orders in Council, since the British restrictions still left loopholes
for some fairly lucratiYe trade. Thus, whUe Jefferson and Kadison smiled
at France and frowned at England, the northern commercial· grOllpS shoutect
their disapproYal, becomini more and more 9dfsgusted with a lovernment which
claimed to be protecting their interests, while its everT act frustrate.
them further.
The question of British impressment of American saUors loomed
large in the e18s of Jefferson and lladison. When England become inYolYed
in war with France, her sailors in foreicn empl07 were ordered home to
serve on British men-of-war. Many of these were reluctant to obey, as they
plainly preferred the well-paid American service rather than the poorlypaid, semi-slavery under British command. The very similarity in the lancua,e and dress of the two nations immediately opened the way to much misunderstandinc, since English nationals relied on the likeness to support
.

...

.

their claims that they were American citizens. Naturally, abuses resulted,
intentional and unintentional, when American shipping, stopped by British
men-of-war, was stripped of its 'British SUbjects', including violently
protesting American sailors.

But impressment had no terrors for NewEng-

landers, in comparison to a war against Britain; John Lowell voiced the
northern viewpoint:
The northern and middle states, who are now united in opinion, possess 3,000,000 of inhabitants, considerably more than
did the whole UDited states at the time of the Declaration of
Independence. -- They are a body of freemen, distinguished for
their industry and virtue. They are the aTmers of nearly two
third parts of all the tonnage of the United states, and furnishes, probably three fourths of all the native seamen. They

3
are totally opposed t. a war for the privilege of pro~cting
British seamen against their own sovereign. They know, from
their own experience, that this subject of impressment is a mere
instrument, wielded by men who are utterly indifferent about the
suffering of the sailors or the merchants. l
.
The affair of the Leoparg and the ChesapeakA brought the matter
.f impressment to a head in the United S~t:s.

On June 22, 1807, the com-

mander of the British line-of-battle ship Leopard stopped the American
frigate Chesapeake, and demanded the persons.of certain British deserters
whom they claimed were on board. When the commander of the Chesapeake
refused to comply, the British ship opened fire, and forcibly removed one
British subject as weU as three Americans.

When the news of this incident

reached the states, Federalists and Republicans alike were ready for war
to avenge the dishonor done the American flag.

The Ess«x Junto, wishing

to embarrass Jefferson in his seeming desire for hostilities, were the only
group which was inclined to condone the act, defending the British point of
view; the majority of the Federalists, however, including such prominent,..
members as John '-tuincy Adams and Harrison Gray Otis, broke away from the
Junto and joined the popular clamor against the outrage, more interested in
revenge than in causing the war-party discomfiture.

Jefferson lost his

chance to declare war at this point when the country was united against the
British, and in the course of his hesitation the issue lost its importance.
Morison, in his Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, considers Jefferson's lack of decision a definite mistake in view of subsequent events:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. A New England Farmer, (Jehn LoweU), Perpetual War, the Policy of Mr.
Madison, Boston, 1812, 5.

4
Looking back on 1807 from a period of Hague confepences and
arbitration treaties, Jefferson's moderation and restraint at that
trying period seems most commendable. But the sequel proved that
none of his expedients could prevent a war, which might far better
have come in 1807, with the entire natien up in arms over the insult to its flag, than in 1812, atter one section of the Union had
been led by four years of commercial restriction into an attitude
of violent disaffection.l
.,." .....
<

On July 2, 1807, Jefferson retaliated by closing the American
ports to British men-of-war, which resulted in a begrudging apology from
Great Britain, and an offer of reparation on~erms which left the United
States no alternative but to refuse.

By this time the New England states

were unconcerned over the impressment and irritated over the closure of
ports; the rest of the coast, however, lost none of its ardor.

On Aucust 3,

1807, John Rutledge of Charleston wrote to Otis in Massachusetts,
Iou are so cool & dispassionate a people in Boston that yo~
seem to have escaped the passion which enflames .s, in consequence
of the outrage on one of our frigates. Altho' I deprecate war
quite as much as any of my friends can, yet, I think, a liar (even
with Great Britain) would prove more honourable prosper.~s & sate,
& less costly, than a state of Peace in which a foreign Nation is
t. exercise the right of searching our National Ships. The gentral business of impressing American seamen was to be sure not wort
mooting -- where G. Britain has in her service one of our sailors
we have twenty of hers on board our Jierchantmen, & this is so well
known in that section of the Union where Mariner a & navigation beleng (New England) that cellmplaints bave ceased. The complainings
come from Virginia, where there are neither sailors nor ship, &
where this is contrived to aliment & concentrate the angry passions fioating through our COlUltry agaimst G. Britain, Altho'
this disgraceful Spirit had brought upon U8 our present deplorabl
condition, & this miserable state is chargeable to the Errors &
Vices of those impirics who administer our government, sttll . ,
friend. we must support this government. With our Ce.mmerce so extend.ed as it is, & our Keels frettin& every sea, we must have a
naVT; & that will be impossible i f our Ships of War are to be
searched -- we must kick against this & fight against it, & fight
as we should pro Aris & focis •••• 2

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. SBJIlL'lel Eliot Morison, Life !Dd Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist,
1765-1848, I, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1913, 276.
2 Ibid., "John Rutledge to otis, Charleston, August 3d, 1807", 284.
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Great Britain answered the American closure of ports
the restrictions contained in the Orders in Council.

b~.

tightening

The first Orders,

issued in January, 1807, had forbidden neutrals to maintain coastwise commerce between French or allied ports; the second Orders, issued the following December, forbade all direct trade betw~n the United States and continental Europe, unless the cargoes were first landed in Britain and duty paid.

.

To add insult to injury came word of the proclamation of October, 1807,
which gave full indorsement of impressment.

Embargo seemed to Jefferson

the only fitting retaliation short of war.
The Embargo, which went into effect in December, 1807, was an extremely unpopular, as well as futile, gesture.

Its main effect was practi-

cally to exterminate the American merchant marine, which was forbidden to
carryon any foreign commerce whatsoever, and its coastwise trade was likewise hampered by "burdensome restrictions".

Its avowed purpose was to pro-

tect American shipping from capture and at the same time force France and

...

England to meet the terms of the United States by depriving them of American
produce; in both instances it failed completely.

While ships were protected

commerce was ruined, and France and England merely looked elsewhere for
their markets.

Added to this was discontent of the people affected, for

the sudden removal of their source of income [alleviated only a little by
smuggling1 resulted in producing conditions of extreme poverty in t~e coastal towns.

New England could hardly be expected to react kindly to the

government which was allowing it to starve because of a measure which carried with it only disadvantage.

It 1829 otis wrote,

To the embargo imposed in December, 1807, nearly all the
delegation of Massachusetts was opposed. The pretexts for impos-

6
ing it were deemed by her citizens a mockery of her sufferings.
Owning nearly one-third of the tonnage in the United States, she
felt that her voice ought to be heard in what related to its se.curity. Depending principally on her foreign trade and fisheries
for support, her situation appeared desperate under the operation
of this law, in its terms perpetual. It was a bitter aggravation
of her sufferings to be told that its object was to preserve thes
interests. l
..

.

<

.."

John Howe, a British spy, scathingly disposed of Jefferson's embargo in the
following letter home:
This countl"T [AaericaJ has lo!g both rulers and people enter
tained an idea, that Great Britain and her Colonies, particularly
her viest India Colonies, could not do without them. And 80 fully
was Mr. Jefferson possessed with that idea, that he conceived his
foolish embargo measure, would inflict such an injury on us, as
would soon compel our uovernment, to give up the order relative
to seamen, the respective orders, founded on the Milan decree to
punish without enquiry any of our Officers whose conduct the~ saw
fit to call in question, and in short that it would compel the
nation to relinguish its sovereignty on the Sea, and to become as
contemptible as they would delight in rendering her. In this expectation, and to cooperate as far as they dared with Bonaparte,
in his attempts to destroy the commerce of England this Embargo
was laid •••• But every mischief Mr. Jefferson calculated, as it
respected Great Britain, has been averted, and the whole pressure
of this. mighty evil is every day operating with increased effect
on this devoted Country, and will each day bring its effects .~
closer home to him and his coadjutors ••••
They appear much mortified here, when I tell them, that we
consider the Embargo a great blessing in Nova Scotia, and that we
think the Bill should have been entitled "An Act for the better
encouragement of the British Colonies in A.merica".2
It was at this point that John -ruincy Adams alienated himself fro
the Federalist party by declaring his approval ot the embargo.

As a conse-

quence, Massachusetts in the elections of June, 1808, refused to support h'
Henry Adams, Documents Relst·
to New En and Federalism, 1800-1815,
"An Appeal to the itizens of the nited ~tstes, by rrison Gray otis;
Little, Hrown, and Company, Boston, 1877, 79.
2 American Historical Review, XVII, "Report ot John Howe, II 1a4acllillan Company, New York, 1912, 89-90.

1
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for re8lection to the Senate, and Adams retaliated by resigning when the
Massachusetts Legislature approved the anti-embargo resolutions.
the opinion of John

~uincy

It was

Adams, however, which influenced Jefferson to

repeal the embargo, since Adams had expressed the opinion that its continuance would be met with "forcible resis~~ce" and possibly by civil war.
Gore describes the rebellion brewing in Boston as a result of the
embargo in a letter to Rufus King of New York,

•

The people of our Country are suffering extremely and must
soon be reduced to absolute wretchedness; I mean that portion of
them, who have hitherto subsisted by navigation, & especially by
the fisheries. They are obliged to depend on charity for food
and fuel. In Beverley & Marblehead this is manifestly the case.
In the latter 2000 dollars has been borrowed by the Town to relieve the necessities. In the former, private contributions have
become very heavy: one Gentleman told me he had already given
to men, heads of families, more than 50 cords of wood in quantities of 2x4 feet •••• This same person said many others in that
Town had already given away much greater quantities in proportion
to their means. In Cape Ann they have continued to send their
fish to market. In Portland, they have in several instances, set
the Officers of Customs at defiance & sent their vessels to sea.
Kilitary companies are now marching Eastward, it is said, for
Salem & Marblehead for the purpose of preventing violations of .~
the Embargo, or, in the words of the Resolutions, to put the
Country in a state of Defense. Genl. strong, who has been here,
thinks the people will BOon require the influence of good men to
liepress or guide their zeal in opposition to the National Government. 2
;

But the actual repeal of the embargo and the substitution of a non-intercourse act toward

~ritain,

in no way decreased the bitterness of the New

Englanders toward the national government.

Its ill-effects could not be

1 Adams' charges are more fully discussed in Chapter III.
2 Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, V, ed. Gharles R. King, "C. Gore
to R. Aing, December 8, 1808", G.P. Putnam's Sons, ~ew York, 1898, 110-111.
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overcome immediately, as this excerpt from a contemporary sermon 4Qffirms,
The painful sensations of the Embargo are still felt. Federalists, such as they were, through the instigation of their
directors, could parade in the street before the Governor's house
in Boston; to request of him relief, under the pressures the7
felt, from the embarrassments of our trade, as if he controled the
Councils of foreign Nations and ~tw acts of Congress. This federal movement, had its infiuence in stirring the People up to the
resistance of the laws; when as the federal writers said, they
were famishing with hunger, and at the same time, to represent the
distress of the Embargo, in all ita shapes, they said, the rich
produce of the Country, was per?-:shjpg in the barns of the Farmers,
and in the store houses of the Merdhants, for the want of a marlet. They said that distress and famine had pervaded not only the
humblf cottages of the poor, but thefPlendid edifices of the
rich.
The war-like tone of the administration was daily becoming more
and more

pron~unced.

In New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Geor-

gia, Kentucky, and Tennessee the m:i.}.itia was preparing for possible conflict.

In political circles the Federalist anti-war party showed increased

strength in the spring elections in New lork and New

~gland,

but they were

...

still a minority with the South and iest seemingly eager to rush headlong
,

into a war for which the country was pitifully Unprepared.

The ,'ederalists,

in desperation, now launChed upon a course totally unexpected by their con-

stituents, and, as Henry Adams.comments, "their behavior, contradicting
their own principles, embarrassed their friends still more than it confuse.
their'enemies. n2 Throwing reasori to the winds, they approached the British
minister, astonishing him by the lengths to which they were prepareato go,
to save their commerceJ

Foster wrote home:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Solomon Aiken, The Kise an Press f the Politic
the
United States A Sermon, P.reached in acutt, liar 11, l.W.l, t Being the
Aruma,) Fast, averhill, 1811, 17.
2 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America, VI, Charles Scrianer's Sons, New York, 1890, 171-172.

a
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The Federal leaders make no scruple of telling me·that they
mean to give their votes for war, although they will remain silent
in the debates; they add that it will be a short war of six or
nine months. To my observations on the strange and dangerous nature of such a policy, they shrug their shoulders, telling me that
they see no end to restrictions and non-importation laws but in
war; that war will turn out the Administration, and then they fill
have their own way, and make a qpUd peace with Great Britain.

On February 1st, two Federalists whose names ,,'oster did not include in his report, paid him a voluntary and unsolicited visit, in which

.

they advised him what course to suggest to his government to pursue, in
order to overthrow the administration, secure New England leadership in
the country, and thus cement friendly relations with Britain.

Foster's

report reads as follows,
The sum of these suggestions was that we should neither revoke our Orders in Council nor modify them in any manner. They
said this Government would, if we conceded, look upon our concessions as being the eftect of their own measure, and plume th~
selves thereon; that they only wanted to get out of their present
difficulties, and if we made a partial concession they would make
use of it to escape fulfilling their pledge to go to war, still
however continuing the restrictory system; whereas it we pushed
them to the edge of the precipice by an unbending attitude, tha1t
then they must be lost, either by the disgrace ot having nearly
ruined the trade of the United states and yet failed to reduce
Great Britain by their system of commercial restrictions, or else
by their incapacity to conduct the government during war. These
gentlemen declared that they were for war rather than for the continuance of the restrictory system, even if the war should last
I
four years. 2
On liarch 9,

l~

Madison again showed his desire to secure declar-

ation ot war against Britain.

He placed betore Congress certain papers

which he had been inveigled into

b~g

trom John HenrJi a British spy, pm·

---------------------------------------------------------------------------1 ~., 172.
2 1l2J.g., 173.
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porting to contain evidence of treason brewing in the New

Englan~

states.

Unable to sell these documents either to his employer, Governor Craig of
Canada, or to the British government, Henry found a market in .Madison who
was casting about for some means of retaliation to the rebellious New Englanders.
~50,OOO,

i125,000.

Madison, aided and abetted by ~n;oe, purchased the papers for
having persuaded Henry to relinguish his original demand for
The Federalists, remembering theiI visit to F'oster, were alarmed

when they learned the circumstances, for Henry had travelled through the
New

~and

states and had been entertained in some of the best homes, whil

unknown to them as a spy. Madison formally presented the material to the
House, saying,
"I

l~

before Congress copies of certain documents, which re
ThE;rFROVE, that at a recent per
iod, whilst the United States, notwithstanding the wrongs sustain
ed by them, ceased not to observe the laws of peace and neutralit
towards Great Britain, and in the midst of amicable professions
and negotiations, on the part of the British government, through
its public minister here, a secret agent was employed, in certain
states, more es eciall at the seat of overnment in l4assachus.ttta
in fomenting disaffection to the constituted authorities of the
nation; and in intrigues with the disaffected, for the purpose of
bringin& about resistance to the laws, and eventually, in concert
with a ~itish force, of destroying the Union, and fO ing the
eastern part thereof into a political connexion with eat Brimain in the ciepartment of state.

~.111

ar

However, the documents were inconclusive and contained no more damaging
statements concerning New England I treason I than they published daily in
"

their local papers.

It seemed that Madison had paid out fifty thousand

American dollars in salary to John Henry that the British government should
have paid, all 'for a quantity of harmless conjectures which, it could safel

11

be assumed, were probably exaggerated as much as possible to
from the spy's employer..

sec~e

favor

The Federalists snickered openly; Sullivan wrote,

It is amusing that Mr. Madison should have "paid an ingenious
Irishman fifty thousand dollars, for an attempt to render a service to the object of his hatred, England. Still more amusing
that all he got for his money, lU\s. a faiihful picture of Jefferso
and himself, drawn by a British painter.
On April 1st, Madison recommended an embargo to last sixty days;

this measure was, of course, recognized as
tual declaration of war.

a~reliminary

gesture to an ac-

The Senate, to delay things a bit, extended the

measure to ninety days.
Madison was renominated in liay for the presidency, and easily secured his reijlection; he was opposed by the Federalist candidates, Clinton
and Ingersol.

Though he carried the electoral votes of Vermont and Penn-

sylVania, it was significant that the large and wealthy states of New York ;
and Massachusetts voted against him, thus demonstrating their opposition to
his war policy.
l4adison I S message of June 1st was markedly hostile to England,
citing as it did her various provocative acts against the United States,
and recommending that definite action be taken.

The message was referred

to a committee whose report was of much the same tenor.

When the House was

asked to authorize a declaration of war, the issue met with violent opposition, only to be passed by a vote of 79-49.
met with trouble:

In the Senate the bill"' also

the anti-war group held up the vote for two weeks, sug-

gesting alternative measures of letters of marque or reprisal, and the
ing of merchant shipping.

ar~

But the Senate, like the House, passed the bill

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1

~.,

290.

I
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by a majority of six votes (19-13).

The President immediately ratified the

action and the country was at war.

Conceming the congressional vote,' Henry

Adams states,
Hardly one-third of the members of (,;ongress believed war to
be their best policy. Almost anQt:aer third were Federalists who
wished to overthrow the Administration; the rest were honest and
perhaps shrewd men, brought up in the school of Virginia and Pennsylvania politics, who saw more clearly the evils that war must
bring that the gpod it might cause, and who dreaded the reaction
upon their constituents •••• By force.of will and intellect the
group of war members [Clay, Calhoun, Cheves and Lowndes] held
their own, and dragged Congress forward in spite of itself. l
Sullivan asserted that the vote of the House proved the war to be
the will of the South and hest, to protect the interests of the protesting
North:
In the House of Representatives the whole numbers of members
was 128; of these 79 voted for the war; and of these (79,) 62 resided south, and 17 north of the Delaware. The Senate consisted
of 32 members, 19 of whom voted for the war, and 14 of these resided south of the Velaware; and 5 of the 19, north. Putting together the war members, of both branches, residing south of the
. Delaware, viz. 62 and 14, they make 76; which is four short of
half of the whole number in both branches. Thus the war may be""
said to have been a measure 6f the south and ~, to take care of
the interests of the north, much against the will of the latter.
The whole number of members of both branches residing north of the
Delaware was 68, of whom only 21 voted for the war. 2

John Lowell expressed the opinion of New England succinctly,
Five years of successive commercial restriction, was found
ineffectual; it made us grow leaner to be sure, but we were strong
and able to survive it. Our persecutors had not patience to endure our lingering death; they therefore got up the guillotine of
a maritime war, to cut off our heads at a stroke. 3
1 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America, VI, New York, 1890,
170.
2 William Sullivan, Familiar Letters on Public Characters and Public Events
Boston, 1834, 311.
3 A New England Farmer (John Lowell), Perpetual War. the Policy of lLr. l4adi·
J2n, Boston, 1812, 4.

;
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In the meantime England had changed her policy and had developed a
more tolerant view of the protests of the United States.

She had no desire

to engage in war with the States when she was struggling to defeat NapOleon.
Sullivan thought that the United States goyernment
deliberately insisted on
., ..,.
maintaining its hostile attitude:
Between the 4th of March, 1809, when Mr Madison became President, and the 18th of June, 1812, when war was declared, England
seems to have desired Sincerely, t~comprom1se the controversies
with this country, and to av6id conflict. lItr. Erskine, a very
young man, and not of much experience, was British minister here,
on the 4th of March. An arrangement was made with him. I t was
said at the time, that lir. Madison knew, or might have known, that
he had exceeded his authority. This arrangement was disavowed in
England, and Erskine recalled. He was succeeded by Francis James
Jackson, whom the administration found so much to be displeased
with, that all communication was cut off with him, and, as it was
then thought, offenSively, and with the design to keep open the
controversy. He was succeeded by Mr. Foster, who was equally unsuccessful. He remained here till war was declared. l
Two days before the declaration of war, a motion was made in the
British House of Commons by Lord Brougham that the Orders in Council be re-

....

voked, insofar as they affected American vessels.
why' such a move would be expedient at that time:

There were two reasons
Napoleon had, at least on

paper, withdrawn the Berlin and Milan decrees, and it had been repeatedly
;

said that the British government would remove its Orders if Napoleon would
his; also, the fact that they were then engaged in heavy struggles with
France hardly encouraged detailing needed troops and ships to America.

Ac-

cordingly, four days after the American declaration of war, the Orders in
Council, with the stipulation that America cease its hostile acts, were reWilliam Sullivan, Familiar Letters on Public Characters and Public Events
1834, 288-289.
1
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pealed, but too late to avert the catastrophe.

When the news reached Ameri-

ca it had no other effect but to place the reasons for declaring war on the
weaker claim, impressment.

Only the Federalists upbraided'the government

for carrying on a war when the main issue had been conceded.
The members of the House who hai' o~posed the war issue were not
to be silenced.

It had been hoped by members ot the administration that the

actual declaration of war would unite the

co~try

In this they were to be sadly disappointed.

against the common foe.

The Adnority in the House made

issue of the fact that they were called into secret session to discuss the
war, and thirty-four of the forty-nine members who had voted against the declaration issued a pamphlet embodying an official protest to the secret session and the inadequacY' of the war claims:
The momentous question of war, [stated the Pamphlet] with
Great Britain, is decided. On this topic, so vital to your interests, the right of public debate, in the face of the world, and
especially of their constituents, has been denied to your representatives. They have been called into secret session, on this .
most interesting of all your public relations, although the c~
eumstances of the time and of the nation afforded no one reason
for secrecy, unless it be found in the apprehension of the effect
of public debate on public opinion; or of public opinion on the
result of the vote.
Eoccept the message of the President of the United States,
;
which is now before the public, nothing confidential was communicated. That message contained no fact, not previously known. No
one reason for war was intimated, but such as was of a nature public and notorious. The intention to wage war and invade Canada
had beep, long since openly avowed. The object of hostUe menace
had been ostentatiously announced. The inadequacy of both our
army and navy for successful invasion, and the insufficiency of
the fortifications for the security of our seaboard, were, every
where, known. Yet the doors of Congress were shut upon the people
They have been carefully kept in ignorance of the progress of
measures, until the purposes of administration were consummated,
and the fate of the country sealed. In a situation so extraordinary, the undersigned have deemed it their duty by no act of theirs
to sanction a proceeding so novel and arbitrary. On the contrary,
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they made every attempt in their power to attain publicity for
their proceedings. AU such attempts were vain. When this momentous subject was stated, as for debate, they demanded that the
doors should be opened.
This being refused, they declined discussion; being perfect
convinced, from indications too plain to be misunderstood, that,
in the house, all argwnent, witri"~osed doors, was hopeless; and
that any act, giving implied validity to so flagrant an abuse of
power, would be little less than treachery to the essential rights
of a free people. In the situation to which the undersigned have
thus been reduced, they are compelled reluctantly to resort to
this public declaration of such vi"s of the state and relations
of the country,
determined their judgment and vote upon the
question of war.

fS

The main object for declaring war they disposed of in these words,
The claim of Great Britain to the services of her seamen is
neither novel, nor peculiar. The doctrine of allegiance for whic
she contends is common to all the governments of Europe. France,
as well as England, has maintained it for centuries. Both nation
claim, in time of war, the services of their subjects. Both by
decrees forbid their entering into foreign employ. Both recall
them by proclamation.
No man can doubt that, in the present state of the French
marine, if American merchant vessels were met at sea, having
French seamen on board, France would take them. Will any man balieve the United States would go to war against France on this
account?
The claim of Great Britain pretends to no further extent,
than to take BritiSh seamen from private merchant vessels. In the
exercise of this claim, her officers take American seamen, and
;
foreign seamen, in the American service; and although she disclaims such abuses, and proffers redress, when known, yet undoubt
edly grievous injuries have resulted to the seamen of the United
States. But the question is, can war be proper for such cause,
before all hope of reasonable accommodation has failed? ~en
after the estinguisbment of such hope, can it be proper, until 0
own practive be so regulated as to remove, in such foreign nation
any reasonable apprehension of injury?2
---------------~~~-------~------------------------------------------------
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On July 15th a meeting of protest against the war was h~ld in
Faneuil Hall in Boston, and on the same day a similar group met in Middlese
County in Massachusetts.

August 6th saw a "rebel" convention in Boston, and

in that same month a convention in Worcester.

All echoed the sentiments of

John Lathrop, who exclaimed, ltA war so unpopular, as the present war appears
to be, cannot be supported."l
The administration met its first

d~ficulty

tempted conscription of New England militia.

of the war in the at-

On April 10, 1812, before war

had been declared, but obviously in expectation of it, Congress had authorized Madison to "require of the executives of the several states and territories, to ••• organize, arm, and equip ••• their respective portions of one
hundred thousand militia. lt2 Congress also authorized the President to appoint the general officers who would have charge of military organization
and campaigns.

To their other provisions they added that the President

might call the militia into service Itin all the exigencies provided by thA,
constitution." This clause gave the Federalists a loophole to dispute the
demands of the national government.
On the strength of the grant s of Congress, Secretary of "War Eusti

wrote the governors of the various states, and directed them to prepare
their militia.

On June 22, at the behest of the PreSident, General Dear-

born wrote, among others, Governor Strong of MassaChusetts and Governor
Griswold of Connecticut, requesting that Massachusetts produce forty-one
----------------------------~-----------------------------------------------

1 John Lathrop, The Present War Unexpected, UnnecessarY, and Ruinous, Boston, 1812, 15.
2 Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833, 234.

t

17
companies, of which fourteen were to be artillery, and 27 infantrt; of Connecticut he requested five companies, two of artillery, and three of infant1)1
Here the General made a grave error.

For the forty-one companies requested

of Massachusetts, he required only two of their officers,
1

lieutenant-colon~

.....

where, as claimed by Dwight, MassaChusetts had the right to appoint a nativl
major or general, since she was asked to provide what amounted to an army
division.

From Connecticut no officers what Siever were desired, and Connec-

ticut, forming a battalion, had the right to be commanded by a major.

To

add to the irritation of the two states, their militia were ordered by the
General to report to the command of United States officers in various parts
of their own states as well as in other New England sectors.

lmmediately

Connecticut and Massachusetts questioned the constitutional right of the
President to call out the militia, since the nexigencies provided by the
constitution" were not present in the existing situation.
Governor Strong of Massachusetts called together the Legislature.....
in special session in October, 1812, and addressed them, in part,

The Constitution of the United States declared, that 'Congress may provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions,'
and the act of Congress of April lOth, 1812, authorizing a detach- ;
ment of 100,000 of the militia, empowers the President to 'call
into actual service any part, or the whole of said detachment, in
all the exigencies provided by the constitution.' From these
clauses in the constitution and the law of. April 10th, the President derives his authority to call the militia of the state's into
actual service; and except in the exigencies above mentioned, he
can have no authority by the constitution to do it. But there was
no suggestion, either in the letter from the War Department, ••• or
±n those from General Dearborn, that this state or Rhode Island
[Where Dearborn proposed to send some Massachusetts troops] was

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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invaded, or in imminent danger ot invasion; or t hat either ot the
exigencies recognized by the constitutional laws ot the United
States existed ••••
I have been tully disposed to comply with the requirements
ot the constitution ot the United States and the laws made in pursuance ot it, and sincerely regretted that any request should be
made by an otficer of the natioaal. government to which I could
not constitutionally conform. l
The governor ot Connecticut made a similar speech to his council,
who emphatically corroborated his sentiments.
This board is not informed that the requisition of General
Dearborn, said to be in pursuance of that ot the Secretary ot War
of the 12th ot instant June, is grounded on a declaration made by
the President of the United States, or notice by him given, that
the militia are required to execute the laws of the Union, ..!Bmpress insurrections, or repel invasions, or that the United-state.
are in imminent danger of invasion. As none of the exigencies
recognized by the constitution and laws of the United States are
shoWll to exist, this board deem his excellency the Governor to be J
of right, the commander in chief of the militia of this state,
and that they cannot ~ be withdrawn from his authority.2
Both states accordingly began to raise militia in defense of their own
territor.y. Needless to say, their attitude was extremely irritating to
Madison, who saw no way to make them contorm.

~

However, New England' s mili-

tia frequently submitted to United States command, particularly after the
invasion of Washington and parts of Maine. But throughout the war, the
soldiers of New England persistently retused to march outside United States
boundaries, and in some instances, outside those ot their respective states,
Madison complained to Gallatin ot the poor c08peration he was receiVing
from the militia:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------'---

1 Ibid., 21.1-243.
2 Ibid., 246.
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Financially too, the government had trouble enlisting ~y support
from New England.

The attitude, HIt's Mr. l4adison's war -- let him pay for

itl" was the prevalent spirit in the northern states, and thus the richest
section of the Union refused its much neede~ support.

The empty treasury

had not bothered the President when he declared war, and he had gone ahead
over the protest of wealthy New England; therefore he might look elsewhere
for money.

The lliddle States consequently hIlA to bear the brunt of the war;

Gallatin described the extent of their sacrifices,
The floating debt, consisting of outstanding Treasury notes
and temporary loans unpaid, amounted, on the 1st of January, 1815,
to eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, about
four-fifths of which were also due to the Kiddle States •••• The
banks made advances beyond their resources, either by their own
subscriptions or by enlarging their discounts in favor of the su~
scribers. They, as well as several wealthy and patriotic citi.en~
displayed great zeal in sustaining the government at a critical
moment, and the banks were for that purpose compelled to enlarge
their issues. 1
.
New England, forced to industry by the restrictive system of the

,..

government in imposing embargoes and non-importation acts, had found a reaciJ
market in the rest of the country for her products. With no English goods
available, specie flooded into New ingland's coffers, where, as far as the
war effort was concerned, it stayed. Gallatin estimated the amount of specie in the New England banks to be, 2
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6,171,000
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In his financial report Gallatin noted that,
------------------~--------------------------------------------------------ed. Henry Adams, Philadelphia, 187~

1 The Writings of Albert Gallatin,
284.
2 Ibid •• 283.
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The circulating capital of the United States, wbi.oh JlUat
ply the l0ans required in time of war, is concentrated in the
large cities, and"principally north of the Potomac. The war was
unpopular in the ~astern States; they contributed less than trom
their wealth might have been anticipated; and the burden tell on
the Middle States. The proceeds of loans (e~lusive ot Treasur7
notes and temporary loans) paid into the Treasury from the commenoement of the war to the end of the year 1814 amounted to tort
one millions ten thousand dollaa-S;.
Of that sum the Eastern States lent • • • • • • • • ~2,900,OOO
New York, Pennsylvania, liaryland, and)
the District of Columbia
) • • • • • • 35,790,000
The Southern and ~iestern States • ..., • • • • • • • • 2,320,oool
Not content with merely refusing to aid the government during the
war, the New England states actually supported the enemy, buying British
bonds at a discount, and supplying them, for a price, with food for their
~anadian

forces; Sir George Prevost, the British commander, wrote to Lord

Bathurst in England in August, 1814:
Two thirds of "the army in Canada are at this moment eating
beef provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the
States of Vermont and New lork. This circumstance, as well as
that of the introduction of large sums of specie into this province, being notorious in the United States, it is to be expected
Congress will take steps to deprive us of those resources, and
under that apprehension large droves are daily crossing the lines
coming into Lower Canada. 2
"
The national government made the mistake of trying to finance the
I

war by loans, only to be secured at high interest, rather than to risk po
larity by exacting heavy taxes from the people.

The Olive Branch, enwnerat

ing the faults of the administration, considered this its most

outst~ding

lapse:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------~., 284.
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2 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America, VII, "Prevost to
Bathurst, August 27, 1814ii, 146.
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The last and perhaps the most grievous and unpardo1iable error
of the democratic party -- an error, pregnant with baleful consequences to the finances and credit of the country, was, depending
on loans for the support of the war, and deferring the imposition
of taxes adequate to erect the superstructure of'public credit upon. This arose from the miserable and pernicious dread ot torteiting popularity, and losing the reins of government -- a dread
often the parent of the most desttlctive measures. The consequence ot this highly reprehensible error was, that the loans were
made to very considerable loss, and that the public credit ot the
nation was most lamentably impaired. l

In the summer of 1814 the war itsell finally approached the borders of Massachusetts.

The British had already captured parts ot Maine, but

now caused alarm in Massachusetts by the capture ot Castine, a small town at
the mouth ot the Penobscot.

Headquarters at Hoston received the added

co~

munication that the British intended to make turther advances, and the need
for adequate and prompt defense became increasingly evident. Since the national government had withdrawn all tinancial aid to the eastern states, the
New Englanders were lett to tace the issue as they might.

Accordingly, GOT-

..

ernor Strong of Massachusetts assembled the legislature, with this explanation for his action,
Since your last adjournment such important changes have taken
place in the state ot our public affairs, and the war in which we
have been unhappily involved has assumed an aspect so threatening
and destructive, that the Council unanimously concurred with me in
opinion that an extraordinary meeting ot the Legislature was indispensable. 2
On the 7th of October the legislature ot Massachusetts vote,d 222

to 59 on a resolution that the Governor's handling ot the detense ot the

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 ll. Carey, The Olive BranCh; 2£, Faults on Both Sides, Philadelphia, 181.5,

76.

2 Theodore Lyman, A Short Account of the Harttord Convention TAken tra.
Official DOCuments and Addressed to the, Fair ll!inged and We]), ~isposed to
Which is added an Attested Copy ot the Secret Journal ot That Body, O. Everett, Boston, 1823, 5.
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state be approved.

On October 13th, the group authorized the govtrnor to

raise a militia of ten thousand men for the defense of the state, by a
of 252 to 71.

vot~

And on October 16th the famous fifth resolution, authorizing

.. .

a convention to be held at Hartford, passed the legislature by a vote of 260
to 90.

....

The resolution read:

Resolyed, That twelve persons be appointed as delegates from
this Commonwealth to meet and confer with delegates from the other
New England States, or any other, ~n the subject of their public
grievances and concerns; and upon tne best means of preserTing our
resources; and of defense against the ene~; and to devise and
suggest for adoption by these respective States such measures as
they may deem expedient; and also to take measures, if they shall
think it proper, for procuring a convention of delegates from all
the United States, in order to revise the Constitution thereof,
and more effectually to secure the support and attachment of all
the people, by placing all upon the basis of fair representation. l
Lyman recorded the votes of the various counties of Massachusetts

on this resolution to refute charges that a small majority influenced the
people to support such a convention; he states,
These votes are recorded, and as we are not disposed to allo
the democratic papers to call the proceedings of the people of •
this State .t that time the work of sorry factions, cabals, and
intrigues, we shall give the votes of the counties of Massachusetts Proper in detail as they appear upon the Journals. of the
House ••••
The county of Suffolk gave
II
Essex
n
Middlesex
Norfolk
"II
Plymouth
II
Bristol
It
Barnstable
II
Worcester
Hampshire
"
Hampden
"

· ·· ·• ·· ·• •• ·• ·• ·• 44J2 yeas and o9 na
17 "
• • • • • 18
• ·
·
11
5
• • · · · • · • · •
3
9
• · • · • • • · • ·
"
1
13
• • • • • • • • • •
2 "
·• •• ·• ·· ·• •• ·• ·· •• •• 364 "
11 "
0 "
• • • • · • · • • • 19 "
12
3 "
• • • · · · • • • •
"
•
• •

n

n
It

n

It

II

It

.'

II

n

---------------------------------------~-----------------------------------

1 Ibid., 6.
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The county of Franklin gave', ••
II
Berkshire. •

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .2014 yeas
.'and
"

2 nays
8

II

226 yeas and 67 nays
We have taken the votesof the House of Representatives as expressing more emphatically the voice of the people, and it appears that
three quarters of all the citizeas.;.of this Commonwealth were, in
1illd±, in favor of the Hartford Convention.!

In

such manner the celebrated Hartford Convention came into being.

It was the direct result of what New England$onsidered governmental oppression and neglect, and the answer to the demand of the people for relief.
The resolution once passed that a convention be held to discuss the sorry
plight of the New England states, the Massachusetts Governor and legislature
prepared to contact the other states to secure their approbation and attendance.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------!!US., 6-7.
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CHAPl'ER II

The Opening of the Convention
The approach to the Convention that the New England states now
felt to be necessary for their survival undeJr, enemy attacks and the supposed
indifference of the United States government, was accomplished by a letter
sent by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the governors of the different

.

states, inviting them to appoint delegates to the proposed convention at
Hartford.

The letter itself was written by John Phillips, president of the

senate of Massachusetts, and Timothy Bigelow, speaker of the house.

The pur

pose of tb4 convention and the objects it had in view to accomplish became
the meat of many a heated controversy, and the suspicion that somewhere in
its structure lurked the seeds of separation and disaffection from the Union
made the name 'Hartford Convention' a lasting stigma on all who had part in
it.

Nevertheless, this letter which each governor of his respective state

received, was safely couched in terms which, while suggesting alteration

01

the existing policy, yet spoke respectfully enough of the Unioni
The general objects of the proposed conference are, first, to
deliberate upon the dangers to which the eastern section of the
Union is exposed by the course of the war, and which there is too
much reason to believe will thicken round them in its progress,
and to devise, i f practicable, means of security and defense which
may be consistent with the preservation of their resources from
total ruin, and adapted to their local situation, mutual relation
and habits! AND NOT REPUGNANT TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS AS MEl4BFlts OF
THE UNION.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Theodore Lyman, A Sho~t Account of the Hartford Convention, Taken from
Official Documents and Addressed to the Flair Minded and t~e Viell DisjoSed to
Which is Added an AttestedCoD~of t~e Secret Journal of hat Bodv, oston,
1823, 9. lHereafter referred to as, LYJ1I8Il, A Short Account or the Hartford
Convention, PP.)
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Theodore Dwight in his History of the Hartford Convention, claimed that
The great object of the states, then, in calling a convention, was, tg confer on the practicability of devising meanS g.t
.security and defense - that is, to perform the task which the
national government had thrown upon them in 1812, and which had
been left upon them down to the time of appointing delegates to
meet in convention, and which ha4 'I1OW become so im.perative that
there was no room to avoid it. l
In the actual report of the Convention the delegates confessed
themselves to beltnaturally led to a consider,.tion ••• of the [immediate] dangers and grievances which menaced" them, and that they, at the behest of the
people of their various states, had in view "suggesting .means of present relief"; in addition, the delegates stated that it was their purpose also to
consider grievances "of a more remote and general description, in the hope
of at taining future security. t12
Upon the passing of the resolution by the Massachusetts House authorizing the calling of a convention to meet at Hartford, and the appoint
of delegates to attend, the aforementioned letter was dispatched to the

v~

ious states, and from Connecticut and Rhode Island came immediate and vigorous response.

Delegates were appointed by these three states and also by

the two counties of Cheshire and Grafton in New Hampshire, and by the county;
of Windham in Vermont.

It was disappointing to the leaders in Massachusetts

that a full representation of the New England states was not obtained, but

---------------------------------------------------------------------------Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833," 409-
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2 The Proceedings of a Convention of De1e~ates from the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island; theounties of Cheshire and Grafton
in the State of New ~pShire; and the County of Windhy in the StAte of
Vermont; Convened at rtford in the State of Connecticut, December 15, 181
Hartford, 1815, 6.
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those states which did respond did so with enthusiastic popular approval,
further indorsed by the Federalist victories in the subsequent congressional
elections,
It was with some misgiving, then,. that President Madison looked
forward to the convention, for reports were about that a reconstruction of
the Federal Union under the dictates of New England might not be improbable.
The whole enterprise seemed to take the

aspe~

of a conspiracy, accentuated

by the utter secrecy which enveloped its proceedings.

But it must be noted

that the delegates appointed by the various states, while very prominent
Federalists, yet represented the more conservative faction.

Had New England

at this time been less careful of her choice of delegates, then the convention might well have become a radical weapon, and sedition, if not actual
secession and civil war, might reasonably have resulted.
Josiah

~uincy

The exclusion of

from the convention is particularly noticeable in this respect

He was highly prominent in the Federalist party, but held extreme views
to what should be the role 'of New England at this time.

a~

Therefore his omis-

sion from the chosen delegates would indicate their desire for moderation -their policy was definite in demanding reform, yet, as they always maintained, they desired that reform to take place within the Union.

That they

knew their power at this stage of the war is needless to repeat.
From lIassachusetts came George Cabot, Nathan Dane, William "Prescott, Harrison Gray Otis, Timothy Bigelow, Joshua Thomas, Samuel Sumner
Wilde, Joseph Lyman, Stephen Longfellow, Jr., Daniel Waldo, Hodijah Bay-lies,
and George Bliss;

Connecticut delegated Chauncey Goodrich, John Treadwell,

James Hillhouse, Zephaniah Swift, Nathaniel Smith, Calvin Goddard, and Roger

I
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Minot Sherman; Rhode Island sent Daniel Lyman, Samuel Ward, Edwar'ti Manton,
and Benjamin Hazard; New Hampshire, Benjamin West and Mills Olcott; and Vermont, William Hall, Jr.

Of these men Otis later said, when defending the

lawful intentions of the convention, that

...

;

they fairly represented whatever of moral, intellectual, or patriotic worth is to be found in the character of the New England community; that they retained all the personal consideration and confidence which are enjoyed by the best citizens, - those who have
deceased, to the hour of their deati; and those who survive, to
the present time. l
.
None could question the characters of the men involved in the convention;
John

~ncy

Adams made no aspersions against their integrity, but held in-

stead that there were other persons of worth in MassaChusetts who held opposite opinions to these men, yet who were not in attendance or represented
therein.

It might be well at this point to insert some references concern-

ing the characters of the delegates, particularly of the group from Massachu

setts, who were dominant in the convention.

The following excerpt from a

confidential letter written just before the convention by John Lowell, is •
lengthy but pertinent; Lowell wrote,
For measures of wisdom and prudence, to be considered and
adopted in common times of tranquillity, perhaps the choice could
not have fallen on more suitable persons than those selected fro.
our State.
Whatever they propose will be received with great respect by
the people; and the boldest measures would be considered prudent,
if suggested by them.
"
But they are not calculated for bold measures. lir Cabot is
undoubtedly the wisest man in our State, or among the very wisest •
••• He is a very practical man, well acquainted with everything
which concerns the best interests of a nation; but Kr Cabot has
1 Henry Adams Documents Relating to New England I<'ederalism" 1800-1815, "An
Appeal to the ~itizens of the United States," by Harrison Gray Otis; Boston,
1877 86.

;
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been always a desponding man as to our public affairs, and their
downward course has confirmed his opinions. He hardly thinks the
temporary preservation of the State worth the effort, and he is
most reluctantly dragged in like a conscript to the duty of a dele
gate. He has no confidence in the possibility of awakening the
people. He will not, therefore, be in favor of any measpre's which
will disturb our sleep. So at lea~t I tear; for I cannot find out
from him what his opinions are. ;;. ..<,
lir otis is naturally timid, and frequently wavering -- today
bold, and tomorrow like a hare trembling at every breeze. It wou
seem by his language that he is prepared for the very boldest mea.
ures; but he receives anonymous let~rs every day or two threatening him with bodily harm. It seems the other party suspect his
firmness. He is sincere in wishing thorough measures; but a thousand fears restrain him.
Bigelow is really bold on the present question, has a just
confidence in the power of Massachusetts, sneers as he ought to do
••• at all the threats of vengeance of the other States; an~if he
was well supported, I have no doubt that measures of dignity and
real relief would be adopted.
Prescott is a firm man, but extremely prudent, and so modest
that he will too readily yield his own opinions to the counsels of
others whom he respects. I think he will give his aid to measures
calculated to procure solid redress.
Mr Dane you know. He is a man of great firmness, approachiJ:llg
to obstinacy, singular, impracticable; and, of course, it must be
uncertain what course he will take. Honestly, however, inclined.
lLr Wilde, of .Kennebec, is a very able man, but one of very
great caution and prudence. He lives among a people naturally bad
and violent; and I should fear that his counsels may be influenced
by that circumstance.
These are the men who will have the greatest influence in our
delegation.
It is to be regretted that we had not chosen two or t~ee sucl
persons as Daniel Sargent, William Sullivan, and volonel Thorndike
I do not know that we have among the delegates a single bold and
ardent man. I know it will be said that such men are not the fittest for counsel. That is perhaps true in common times; but in
times of great trouble they are often the most proper, and, indeed,
the only ones fit to direct and manage affairs.
I should fear that the Connecticut delegation, though extreme-

I
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ly respectable, was of much the same character.

.'

If it is that expedient that nothing decisive should be done,
then it is to be regretted that so respectable a Convention was
called, because it tends to degrade and disgrace the members and
the people who sent them.
But, i f effectual measures We'Fe in contemplation, it is in my
judgment to be regretted that some few more active and resolute
men were not elected. l
Both Theodore Lyman and Theodore Dwight devote much space in their respec-

•

tive books to the defense of the characters of these men.

Their integrity

was indeed unquestionable, however slight the bearing it might have had on
their views regarding secession at that stage of affairs; but it might be
fairly successfully maintained that their word could be accepted when they
declared that no such alternative entered into the arguments of the delegates or Journal of the convention, Particularly since no shred of evidence
existed to the contrary.
But the inviolable secrecy which surrounded the proceedings of the

...

convention fanned the suspicions of the rest of the country to no small degree, especially in view of the fact that l4r. Jiadison' s emissary, sent to
report on the gathering, was not permitted to attend.

Added to this was the

glaring fact, that though the report of the convention was published widely,
its secret jounnal was not disclosed until 1820.

The reason for this delay

was explained by Dwight,
When the Convention adjourned on the 5th of January, 1815, it
was supposed that it might be necessary for them to hold a second
.meeting. With that expectation, when they adjourned, they did not
think it expedient to remove the injunction of secrecy under which
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the members had been laid at the commencement of the s~sion; and
the journal was sealed, and placed for safe keeping in the hands
of the President. When it was found that it was not likely to be
published, the charge of meditated sedition and treason was repeated in every quarter. l
This omission, however, continued to expose the convention to intensive
1- .,.

abuse, and when the journal finally was published, it was done in an attan
to vindicate the members and the states concerned from the stigma which enveloped the Hartford Convention.
The first act of the convention upon assembling on December 15,
1814, was to elect unanimously George Cabot President; Theodore Dwight, not
a member, was chosen as Secretary. The second step was to appoint a

co~

mittee on rules and order, and of their report subsequently submitted and
approved, the following natation, as indicated above, became the cause of
endless speculations and considerable calumnious insinuations.
The most inviolable secrecy shall ,be observed by each member
of this Convention, including the Secretary, as to all propositions, debates, and proceedings thereof, until this injunction
shall be suspended, or altered.2
M
A committee of five, Goodrich, OtiS, Lyman of Rhode Island, Swift, and Dane

were appointed lito inquire what subjects will be proper to be considered by
this Convention"; their report was given on Saturday, December 17, and was
thereupon discussed.

Another committee of five, Smith, Otis, Goddard, West

and Hazard, was then appointed lito prepare and report a general project of
such measures as it may be proper for this Convention to adopt".

This be-

ing returned, it was discussed and amended, and Prescott and Dane were add1 Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833, 381.
2 Theodore Lyman, A Short Acoount of the Hartford eonvention, 24.

;
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ed to the committee to arrange the final draft.

.'

The points of discussion as

outlined in the journal of the convention were,
1. That it will be expedient for this Convention to prepare
a general statement of the unconstitutional attempts of the Executive Government of the United States to infringe upon the rights
of the individual States, in regard? to the militia, and of the
still more alarming claims to infringe the rights of the States,
manifested in the letter of the Secretary of War, and in the bills
pending before Congress, or acts passed by them, and also to recommend to the Legislatures of the States, the adoption of the
most effective and decisive measurea, to protect the Militia and
the States from the usurpations contained in these proceedings.
2. That it will be expedient, also, to prepare a statement,
exhibiting the necessity which the improvidence and inability of
the General Government have imposed upon the several States, of
providing for their own defense, and the impossibility of their
discharging this duty, and at the same time fulfilling the requisitions of the General Government; and also, to recommend to the
Legislatures of the several States, to make provision for mutual
defense, and to make an earnest application to the Government of
the United States, with a view to some arrangement, whereby the
States may be enable to retain a portion of the taxes levied by
Congress, for the purposes of self defense, and for the reimbursement of expenses already incurred, on account of the United States

3. That it is expedient to recommend to the several State •
Legislatures, certain amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, hereafter enumerated, to be by them adopted and proposed.
1. That the power to declare or make war, by the Congress
of the United States be restricted.
2. That it is expedient to attempt to make provision for
restraining Congress in the exercise of an unlimited power, to
make new States, and admit them into this Union.

3. That the powers of !,;ongress be restrained in laying
embargoes, and restrictions on commerce.

4. That a President shall not be elected from the same
State two terms successively.
5. That the same person shall not be elected P~esident a
second time.

I
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6. That an amendment be proposed, respecting stave representation, and slave taxation. l
The remainder of the convention was spent in discussion of these
points and in preparation of the Report, and immediately upon the adjournment of that body on January 5, 1816, the_Pert was published and widely
circulated.

Two copies of it were sent to the Governor of each state --

one for his private use, and one to be placed before the State Legislature •
Of the report Dwight remarks that,

•

The expectations of those who apprehended it would contain
sentiments of a seditious, if not of a treasonable character, were
entirely disappointed •••• Equally free was it from advancing doctrines which had a tendency to destroy the union of the states.
On the contrary, it breathed an ardent attachment to the integrity
of the republic. 2
And the report of the convention does reiterate most emphatically the regard
of New England for the Union and its complete loyalty to it; nevertheless,
it proceeded to point out, with elaborate and efficient argument, the various places wherein the administration and the constitution of the United *
States failed in their regard.

The powers of the national government regar

ing the calling out of militia were discussed at length.

The fact that the

authority of the national government on this point was constitutionally restr~cted

to 'executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrections and

repelling invasions I gave New England grounds to dispute the use of the mili
tia for tlMr. Madison's War", since it could not be classified strictly under
one of these headings.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------!Jag., 29-30.
2 Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, 380.
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It follows conclusively, [states the Report] , th4t for all
general and ordinary purposes, this power [of calling the militi
belongs to the states respectively, and to them alone. It is not
only with regret, but with astonishment, the co~vention perceive
that under the color of an authority conferred with such plain
and precise limitations, a power is arrogated by the executive
government, and in some instances sanctioned by the two houses of
congress, of control over the milltla, which if conceded will
render nugatory the rightful authority of the individual states
over that class o~ men, and by placing at the disposal of the
national government the lives and services of the great body of
the people, enable it at pleasure to destroy their liberties, and
erect a military despotism on the ~s.l
Additional New Bngland grievances were, as outlined in the lieport,
First. -- A deliberate and extensive system for effecting a combination among certain states, by exciting local jealousies and
ambition, so as to secure to popular leaders in one section of th
Vnion, the control of public affairs in perpetual succession. To
which primary object most other characteristics of the system may
be reconciled.
Sec9g,sU,y. -- The political intolerance displayed and avowed in
extlud1ng from office men of unexceptionable merit, for want of
adherence to the executive creed.
Thirdly. -- The infraction of the judiciary authority and rights,
by depriving judges of their offices in violation of the consti~u
tion.
Fourthly. -- The abolition of existing taxes, requisite to prepare the country for those changes to which nations are always
posed, with a view to the acquisition of popular favor.
Fifthly. -- The influence of patronage in the distribution of
offices •••• SixthlY. -- The admission of new states into the Union formed at
pleasure in the western region, has destroyed the balance of powe
which existed among the original States, and deeply affected thei
interest.
SeventhlY. -- The easy admission of naturalized foreigners, to

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 American History Leaflets, 'Report of the Hartford Convention', ed. Albert BUshnell Hart and Edward Channing, A. Lovell and Company, New York,
1906, 17-18.
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places of trust, honour or profit, operating as an inducement to
the malcontent subjects of the old world to come to the States,
in quest of executive patronage, and to repay it by an abject devotion to executive measure,.
Eightly. -- Hostility to Great Britain and partiality to the late
government of France, adopted as ~oincident with popular prejudice, and subservient to the roam Object, party power. Connected
with these must be ranked erroneous and distorted estimates of th
power and resources of those nations, of the probable results of
their controversies, and of our political relations to them respectively.
Lastly
regard
regard
render

•

and principally. -- A visionary and superficial theory in
to commerce, accompanied by a real hatred but a feigned
to its interests, and a ruinous perseverance in efforts to
it an instrument of coercion and war.1

But the delegates did not rest the entire blame for existing conditions upo
the administration, though it is obvious from the above that they desired
end of the 'Virginia dynasty' and a more liberal policy in regard to their
commercial interests.

"It is not

conceivab1e,~

continued the Report, "that

the obliquity of an administration could, in so short a period, have so
nearly consummated the work of national ruin, unless favored by defects iQ.
the constitution."2 Consequently, the Report proceeded to make the following recommendations to the legislatures of the states represented at the
Convention, and added certain amendments to the constitution to be proposed
to the national government:
THEItEFORE RESOLVED,

That it be and hereby is recommended to the legis1at~es of
the several states represented in this Convention, to adopt all
such measures as may be necessary effectually to protect the citi
zens of said states from the operation and effects of all acts
whicp have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United
--------------------------------------------------~--- ---------------------

1 Ibid., 17-19.
2 Ibid., 19.
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States, which shall contain provisions, subjecting the 1Id.1itia or
other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments,
not authorized by the constitution of the United States.
Resolyeg, That it be and hereby is recommended to the said
Legislatures, to authorize an immediate and earnest application
to be made to the government of the United States, requesting
their consent ••• to be empowered~d~assume upon themselves the defense of their territory against the enemy; and a reasonable portion of the taxes, collected within said States, may be paid to
the respective treasuries thereof, and appropriated to the payment
of the balance due said States, and to the future defense of the
same ••••
Resolved, That it be ,and hereby is, recommended to the Legislatures of the aforesaid states, to pass laws ••• authorizing the
governors or commanders-in-chief of their militia to make detachments from the same, or to form voluntary corps, ••• and to cause
the same to be well armed, equipped, and disciplined, and held in
readiness for service; and upon the request of the governor of
either of the other states to employ the whole of such detachment
or corps, as well as the regular forces of the state, or such part
thereof as may be required and can be spared consistently with the
safety of the state, in assisting the state, making such request.
to repel any invasion thereof which shall be made or at tempted by
the public enemy.
Resolved, That the following amendments to the constitution
of the United States be recommended to the states represented as
aforesaid, to be proposed by them for adoption by the states legt
latures, and in such cases as may be deemed expedient by a conven.~ion chosen by the people of each state ••••
Fir§t. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this
Union, according to their respective numbers of £ree persons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, and all other persons. {that is, Negroes].
SeCond. No new state shall be admitted into the Union by
Congress, in virtue of the power granted b, the constitution, wit
out the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses.
Third. Congress shall not have the power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United states
in the ports or harbours thereof, for more than sixty days.
Fourth. Congress shall not have power, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses, to interdict the commercial

I
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in~ercourse
th~

between the United States and any foreign na1.ion, or
dependencies thereof.

Fifth. Congress shall not make or declare war, or authoracts of hostility against any foreign nation,'without the concut'rence of two-thirds of both houses, except such acts of hostilit~ be in defense of the territori!s of the United States when act~ly invaded.
~ ~
iz~

Sixth. No person who
be eligible as a member
.ta~ives of the United ~ates,
ottice under the authority of
sh~

shall hereafter be naturalized,
of the senate or house of represennor capable of holding any civil
the ~ted States.

SeVenth. The same person shall not be elected president
ot the United States a second time, nor shall the president be
elected from the same state two terms in succession. l
Th~

Report closed with the turther provision for another conven-

tion, Should their requests be ignored or the war not end.

Three commission

ers wer, dispatched to WaShington with the report of the Gonvention, only to
find on theit" arrival. that peace had just been declared and their cause
thereby rendered ridiculous. The general rejoicing which tollowed the Trea-

.-

ty of Ghent ."as augmented stm more by the great American victory over the
British at N8w Orleans, the news of which arrived very shortly betore that
of the

eoncl~sion

peace,

-arme~

of peace.

The fact of this triumph, so coincident with

the hearts of the people toward the administration for what

they c0tlsidefed brilliant handling of the war.

The fact that the reasons

for whieh waf had been declared were not even mentioned in the treaty of
peace wQs overlooked by all in the heat of victory, and the Hartford
tion baeame
government.

~he

~onven

object of general contempt for opposing the policy of the

Concerning this situation Dwight comments bitterly,

-------,----,---------------------------------------------------------------
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The fiush of feeling which this victory [New OrleahsJ occasioned, drew the public attention away from the treaty of peace,
and the vast expense of treasure_and blood which the war had
given rise to; and the administration and their ~evoted friends,
with their usual skill, turned it to their 01V11 account. As a
never-failing source of profit to the leaders of the party in po
er, the public resentment was excited against the opposers of the
war, and particularly against tn. '.Bew England states, and the
Hartford Convention became the theme of universal calumny and reproach. Not being able to find anything to justify this virulen
in the report, it was alleged with as much apparent confidence as
it it had been known to be a matter of fact, that although the
report itself contained no evidenc,of treason, or even of sedition, yet the history of their secret proceedings, whenever they
should be made public, would disclose an abundance of proof of
the existence of both.l
But the secret journal had been sealed and given for sate keeping to George
Cabot at the close of the convention, and when it was found that it was not
going to be published, heated charges of treason and sedition were flung at
the New England participants.

It

1f8.S

indeed a mistake that the Journal was

not published immediately, for when it did come out, it was so harmless a

..

document that it could not convince the country that it was authentic, and
as a consequence it did little or nothing to restrain the tide of resentment against the Hartford Convention.

;

---------~--------~-------------------~-~--------

1 Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, 381.
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CHAPl'ER III
The Post-Convention Period
However adversely the Hartford Convention was to impress the rest
of the country in years to come, immediate1.Y..;upon its adjournment and the
pUblication of the Report, the general reaction was one of relief.

The~

tional Intelligencer, semi-official voice of the Madison administration,

•

while still somewhat dazed over the apparently harmless conclusions of the
delegates, issued the following rather passive comment:
Certain it is, that the proceedings are tempered with more
moderation than was to have been expected from the contemporaneous
exposition, in the Eastern papers, of the views and objects of thE
Convention. A separation from the Union, so far from being openly recommended, is the subject only of remote allusion. If the
object of calling the Convention really was to propose separation
from the Union, they appear to be determined to effect it peaceably, if they can.1
The Federalists too, seemed very
the oonvention.

much

pleased with the results of

In Massachusetts the General Court referred the report of.

the convention to a committee which studied it thoroughly and brought back
on January 25th the following appraisal:
The Committee entertain a high sense of the wisdom and abUi- ;
ty with which the convention of delegates have discharged their
arduous trust; while they maintain the principle of State sovereignty, and of the duties which citizens owe to their respective
State governments, they give the most satisfactory proofs of attachment to the Constitution of the United States, and to the national Union. 2
.'

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Samuel Eliot Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray otis, Federalist,
1765-1848, II, OPe cit., "National Intelligencer " Januarl14, 1815; Boston,
1913, 157. (H~reafter referred to as, Morison, Life and Letters of HarrisoD
Gray otis, pp.)
2 Ibid., 160.
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In the meantime the national government had passed a bill. authorizing the raising and maintaining of state troops at its own expense, tor
which action the Federalists took to themselves the credit.
turn of events, Gore, then senator from

Mas~achusetts,

Regarding this

reported back to

Governor strong,
My dear Sir,
The bill tor State troops has passed the House with an
amendment to the only section inte~sting to us, said not to be
important.
The result of the Hartford Convention is here, and affords satisfaction to most, i f not to all, -- to some, because
they see not the point nor consequence of the recommendation as
relates to taxes.
The gentlemen had a difticult task, which, according to

~ poor judgment, they have executed with wisdom and discretion. l

On January 19th, Dr. Logan wrote his opinion of the Convention to Pickering
I have with pleasure perused the proceedings of the Harttord
Convention. The prudence and magnanimity of that body does the
greatest credit to its patriotic spirit, and may afford a rallying point to our distracted country. It appears nothing of wisdom can be expected from our public councils at Washington. 2
.Even Pickering, who had been an extremist in his views, was satisfied with
the results of the Report.

In his letter to Lowell, written January 23rd,
;

he said,
I think the report of the Convention bears the high character of wisdom, tirmness, and dignity. They have explicitly pronounced sentence of condemnation upon a miserable administration,
and, stamped as it is with the authority of a body of men so eminently distinguished, that judgment cannot fail of making a just
impression where it is needed. They have made a declaration of
principles the landmarks by which the Legislatures and the people
may direct their course. And they have, in terms that none can
mistake, and which our rulers, whatever for a time they may ef-

--------------------------------------------------------------------------Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, Boston, 1878, 559-

1

560.
2

Ibid.

560.

fect, will not venture to disregard, manitested a deterLination
to apply those principles in corresponding measures, when the future conductlor neglects of the government shall require their
application.
.
But the hapless comadttee wbichhad been sent to Washington with
a copy ot the recO.IIIDI.endations, _t as they...w.re on their arrival with the
news ot peace, were exposed to the liberal ridicule of their opponents.
Ridicule hardened into contempt under the hands ot the Democrats, who turn-

...

ed the situation to their own account and convinced the country that treach
ery and treason had been the keynotes at Harttord.

That connection with

the Harttord Convention marked the political ruin of all concerned in it,
is a talse conclusion, as many of those men held political oftices thereafter, but their participation in it did make them a mark for the insinuationa of their opponents.
There were many ardent Federalists, who, atter peace had been declared, were not quite willing to abandon opposition to the administration

-

.

and who wished to contlllue to thwart the national. government in every move
it made.

otis, however, led the greater part of the Federalist party in an

intinitely wiser course.

His biographer states that

He perceived, within the tirst year of peace, that the Republican party, having absorbed every Federalist principle of per
manent value, did not intend to use its power to the detriment of
New England's sectional interests, and that under these circumstances there could be no object in withholding Federalist suppo
tram Madison and Monroe. 2
.
In the Columbian Centinel of December 26th, 181.8, Otis definitely declared

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Ibid., 562.
2 Morison, Lite and Letters ot Harrison Gray Otis, II, 201-202.
I

I

~'

his stand in the course of a discussion on Massachusetts' war cla1mB:
As at present 11 all t swell," -- and the measures of government
are favorable not less to the interests of your part of the Union
than to the rest; as a due disposition has been manifested to provide for the great interests of navigation, the fisheries and manufactures, and you have no cause of complaint, I think the oftener
your Governor, your Legislature, ~e'ur able essayists, and your
great and good men, shew a readiness to approach the national government, to give it just credit for what it deserves, and to support its measures, the more effectually will they baffle the wiles
of those who wish that collisions may be eternal, wear off the
edge of prejudices, and reconcile taeir opponents to the merit of
their claim. l
Otis was senator from l4a.ssachusetts from 1817 to 1822, and this
position was made especially difficult for him since suggestions from l4assachusetts were generally accepted with poor grace, and because he was continual1y open to attacks in debate upon his own and the treason of his state.
This attitude led hiDl to assume the defense of the Hartford Convention, and
under the pseudonym •One of the Convention' 2 he bepn what was to become
first of many vindications of that body.

The fact that the secret journal
'

....

had not yet been published added fuel to the various attacks on the members
of the Convention, and it was to accomplish its publication, therefore, and
to defend the integrity of those concerned, that Otis became involved in
political controversy.

His first step was to consult the surviving members

of the group and to obtain their consent to the publication of the journal.
To each delegate, then, he sent tbe following letter,
Dear Sir: It has occurred to me that justice to the States represented in the late Hartford Uonvention seems to require that the
private journal of their proceedings should be deposited in some
place to which access may be had by any person disposed to give
---------------------------------------------------------~-------------------

1
2

Ibid., 202.
~., 2l5.
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them publicity. You need not be informed of the disposition of a
numerous class, to impute to that Convention projects that would
not bear the light, and to produce if possible a general opinion
that the things which are seen affDrd no clue to the unholy mysteries of our conclave. While as individuals we regard these efforts with unconcern, we ought not perhaps to be indifferent to
the effects of an erroneous public, opinion on this subject upon
the present age and posterity; iiP 1;he mere unvarnished joumal
would be sufficient for its correction. Mr. Cabot, Mr. Prescott,
and other members in this vicinitT concur in these sentiments, and
if you should be content that we may make such a disposition of
that journal as may be thought best for the object here expressed,
I request of you the favor to signiIY your acquiescence by a line
to Mr. Cabot with convenient dispatch.
Signed, _______1

In due course consent was received from

all concerned (except from two mem-

bers, who made no reply at all), and a copy of the journal, together with
an explanatory letter, was sent to the National Intelligencer for publication.

Perhaps the biggest mistake the delegates made was not to publish the

journal immediately atter their object (termination of the war) had been attained; but it seems almost as glaring an error to have published it so man

,-

years laters, especially in view of the fact that it contained nothing more

incriminating than had already appeared in the Report. While this situatio
could not have injured them any more than the Report, had it been published
;

immediately, when it did come out it was the more damaging because of its
innocence, and from all sides came the charge that it was not the true record.

Doubts of the veracity of the journal of a necessity impugned

.~he

word of George Cabot, who had presented it with a certificate of its integrity:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 One of the Convention, Letters Veveloping the Character and Views of the
Hartford Convention, Washington, 1820, 5.

44

.'

I, George Cabot, late Pr.,ident of the Convention, assembled
at Hartford, on the fifteenth day of December, 1814, do hereby
certify, that the foregoing is the original and only Journal of
the proceedings of that Convention; and that the twenty-seven
written pages, which compose it, and the printed report, heretofore published, comprise a faithful and complete record of all thE
motions, resolutions, votes, an~ proceedings, of that Convention.
-And I do further certify, that ;Ptflis journal has been constantly
in my exclusive custody, from the time of the adjournment of the
Convention, to the delivery of it into the office of the SecretarJ
of this Commonwealth.
George Cabotl
Boston, November 16, 1819.
Of course, the other meabers of the Federalist party flew to the defense of
Cabot's character, as well as those of the other members of the convention.
William Sullivan, Theodore Lyman, and Theodore Dwight particularly devote
a portion of their books to this object.

Said Dwight,

Mr Cabot was a man of the highest respectability for understanding, integrity, and.talents. He had more reputation to lose
than scores together of those who would impeach his veracity can
lay claim to or boast of. His declaration on any subject would
have been taken for truth, wherever he was well known, with as
much confidence as if it had been sanctioned by the most solemn,.
oath. Here it is impeached [by assertions that the journal was
falsified] by nothing but the unsupported assertions or suggestions of political partizans -- men without manners, without prin
ciples, and of course without reputation. 2
In 1831, Roger Minot Sherman, a member of the convention, testified under
oath in a libel case, that
There was not, to the best of my recollection, a single motion OJ:
subject of debate, but what appears in the Journal.. ... 1 be;J.ieve
I know their proceedings perfectly, and that very measure, ~
or pro po sea, has been published to the world.3
Dwight himself testified in the capacity of a 'disinterested witness' con------------------~~-----------------~-----------------------------------

1 Lyman, A Short Account of the Hartford Convention, 35-36.
2 Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, 403-404.
3 Ibid., 404.

;

r-

45
cerning the veracitr of the journal, which he, as Secretary, had &mpiled;
But if a disinterested witness should be kept back, who might
be produced, an inference might be drawn by some caviller, from
that circumstance, unfavorable to the character and conduct of the
Convention. Such a witness is the author of this work - the Secretary of the Convention; and he feels it a duty which he owes to
truth, and the characters of as ~Spectable, patriotic, and virtuous a body of men, as ever were collected on any occasion, to
say, in the most positive and unhesitating manner, and with all
the solemnity which the nature of the case requires, that the
JOURNAL AND THE REPORT OF THE CONVENTION, CONTAIN A FULL, COllPLETE, AND SPECIFIC ACCOUNT OF ALL iHE MOTIONS, VOTES, AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION.l

Thomas Jefferson was the unwitting cause of another long and heated controversy on the already much-disputed designs of the Hartford Convention.

In

a letter to vvilliam Giles, written December 25, 1825, Jeffereon

mentioned an interview with John Quincy Adams, in which he stated that Adams
had informed him that certain citizens of Massachusetts had engaged in treasonable negotiations with the British, and that the repeal of the embargo
would be absolutely necessary to win back those who were inclined toward
dieunion.

The letter reiterates that Jefferson was none too sure of his

....

statements, since the events had become confused in his mind over that period of time, and that the impressions he relates are "the best exertion of
a waning memory that he could command".

Nevertheless, this communication

to Giles was the first log on the fire of a lengthy battle on the ever-fertile subject of New England's deportment during the war.

Said Jefferson's
"

letter:

He ~ohn ~uincy Adams] spoke, then, of the dissatisfaction of
the Eastern portion of our confederacy with the restraints of the
embargo then existing, and their restlessness under it; that there
---------------------------------------------------------------~------------

1

~.,

405.

I

r

46

was nothing which might not be attempted to rid themsel*es of it;
that he had information of the most unquestionable certainty, tha
certain citizens of the Eastern States (I think he named Massachu
setts particularly,) were in negotiation with agents of the British government, the object of which was an agreement that the Bew
England States should take no further part in the war then going
on; that, without formally declaring their separation from the
Union of the States, they should.;;.w'ithdraw from all aid and obedience to them; that their navigation and commerce should be free
from restraint and interruption by the British; that they should
be considered and treated by them as neutrals, and as such might
conduct themselves towards both parties, and at the close of the
war, be at liberty to rejoin the copfederacy.
He assured me that there was eminent danger that the convention would take place; that the temptations were such as might
debauch many from their fidelity to the Union; and that, to enabl
its friends to make head against it, the repeal of the embargo wa
absolutely necessary •
••• However reluctant I was to abandon the measure ,(a measur
which, persevered in a little longer, we had subsequent and sat is
factory assurance, would have effected its object completely),
from that moment, and influenced by that information, I saw the
necessity of abandoning it; and, instead of effecting our purpose
by this peaceful weapon, we must fight it out, or break the Union
I then recommended to ~ friends to yield to the necessity of a
repeal of the embargo, and to endeavor to supply its place by the
best substitute in which they could procure a general concurrenc,1
I cannot too often repeat that this is not pretended to be .
the very words which passed; that it only gives faithfully the im
pression remaining on my mind •••• l
The publication of this letter led John Quincy Adams to authorize a statement which appeared October 21, 1828, in the National Intelligencer, in
which article it was said that J·etferson had surely erred, since at the tim
the supposed conversation had taken place, Adams was not in the country.
The article asserted that,
Henry Adams, D~cuments Relating to New England Federalism, 'Thomas Jefferson to William. Giles, December 25, 1825,' 12-13.

1

;

~ ~---------------------------------------------------4~7
In August, 1809, Mr. Adams embarked for Russia, nearly' three
before the Declaration of War, and did not return to the
Urahd States till August, lS17, nearly three ye~s after the conc]lll)n of peace •••• It was impossible, therefore, that Mr. Adams
coo have given any information to Mr. Jefferson, of negotiation~
bJltizens of Massachuseits with British agents, during the war,
onring relation to it.
11111

;.J.

of,;

The intervieio which Mr. Jefferson referred, continued the National 1ntelligencer,bk place on March 15, 180S, in which conference Mr. Adams
had only mellilned the embargo indirectly, and N.•w England I s efforts to obtain its refill were hot in any way discussed.
ernor of NOVlI~otia had written to

t

But both knew that the Gov-

a person in the State of Massachusetts

in the summellt 1807, before the embargo had been instituted, and from thai
incident, co~ed with ~ other facts t and with the known resistance of Massachusetts to iiadministration,

"Mr

Adams and Mr Jefferson drew their infer-

ences, whichllbsequent events doubtless confirmed". 2 But these inferences
neither had municated to the other, and no other confidential interview
had taken pI111 between them during the administration of Jefferson.

How-

ever, some III~rs which Adams had written to Giles after he (Adams) had resigned his SIll in the senate in May, 1905, warned that a continuance of th4
embargo woul{1e met with "forcible resistance, supported by the Legislature, and pnlUy by the Judiciary of the State", and that if the national
government

s~t

to end the resistance by force of arms, a civil war would

undoubtedly rII\ll.t, in which event "he bad no doubt the leaders of the part.
would secureme cooperation with them of Great Britain. II

Adams had turthe.

1 Corresponlll~e Between John Quin~ Adams, Esquire, President of the Un:lted States, aM~everal Citizens of
ssachusetts Concerning the Charfie of a
Design to DillLve the Union Alleged to Have EXisted in That state, oston,
lS29, 6.
2 Ibid., 6-1,
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asserted in these letters that he had "unequivocal evidence, although not
provable in a court of law" that it had been their object for some time to
secure severance with the Union, and that in the case of civil war they
would assuredly turn to Great Britain for the necessary aid.
;.J.

oil'

That Jefferson had seen these letters, Adams never knew, but he
believed that he had read them and had thus come to confuse them over a period of years with the conversation of March, 1.808.

Adams "certainly had no

objectionlf, cootinued the article, "that they should be communicated to Mr
Jefferson; but this was neither his intention nor desire. ,,1
But the publication of Jefferson's letter and adams' response were
not destined to go unchallenged, for they evoked from New England a demand
for proof of the charges made, and began the celebrated and brilliant controversy between the Massachusetts Federalists and John

~uincy

Adams.

It

will be remembered that these events occurred in 1828, and the controversy
resolved itself not so much around the letters as around the more heinous ....
Hartford Convention, as being the culmination of the treasonable tendencies
of New England.
Adams had no desire to become involved in any dispute with the Nell
Englanders, but they demanded that he prove his statements or retract them.
The follow.ing,letter was sent him, consequently, dated November 26, 1828:
The undersigned citizens of Massachusetts, residing in Boston
and its vicinity, take the liberty of addressing you on the subject of a statement published in the "National Intelligencer" of
the 21st of October, and which purports to have been communicated
or authorized by you •••• [Then follows a summary of Adams' statements as outlined above].
The object of this letter, therefore, is to request you to

------------------------------------------------.--------------------------1 Ibid. 8-9.
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state First, Who are the persons designated as leaders of the party
prevailing in Massachusetts in the year 1808, whose object, you
assert, was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of the
Union, and the establishment of a separate confederacy? and, -Secondly, The whole

evidence.o~

which that charge is founded.

It is admitted in the statement of the charge that it is not
provable in a court of law, and, of course, that you are not in
possession of any. legal evidence to maintain it. The evidence,
however, must have been such as in y,Rur opinion would have been
pronounced unequiVQcal by upright ana honorable men of discriminat
ing minds; and we may certainly expect from your sense of justice
and self-respect a full disclosure of all that you possess.

A charge of this nature, coming as it does from the first
magistrate of the nation, acquires an importance which we cannot
affect to disregard; and it is one which we ought not leave unanswered. l
H. G. Otis

Israel Thorndike
T. H. Perkins
Wm. Prescott
Daniel Sargent
Jom Lowell
Wm. Sullivan

Charles Jackson
Warren Dutton
Benj. Pickman
Henry Cabot
Son of the late George Cabot
C. C. Parsons
Son of Theophilus Parsons,
Esq. d e c e a s e d ' "
Franklin Dexter
Son of late Samuel Dexter

Hoping to conciliate the injured Federalists, Adams wrote a letter
explanatory of his motive in authorizing the statement which had appeared in
the National Intelligencer, assuring them that his intention had not been to
offend them personally, nor the memory of their fathers who had taken part
in the Hartford Convention:
••• The statement authorized by me, as published in the "National Intelligencer, It was made, not only without the intention,
but without the most distant imagination of offending you or of in

__________ J~!~_~l_~~=_~f_~~l_~~~~~~_~~=_~~~~~!!ll_!~~_~~=-£~~!=-~~-=
I Henry Adams, Documents Relating to New England Federalism, 'To the Honorable John Quincy Adams', 43-45.
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pressly disavowing a charge which was made before the public,
sanctioned with the name of the late Mr. Jefferson, imputing to
certain citizens of MassaChusetts treasonable negotiations with
the British government during the war, and expressly stating that
he had received the information of this FR<J4 ME. On the publication of this letter, I deemed it indispensably due to myself, and
to all the citizens of Massachus~tt<s, not only to deny havinf ever
given such information, but all kb~ledge of such a fact ••••
Adams closed his letter with an appeal to let the matter end there, but suc
was not the design of Otis and his friends.

In their names Otis undertook

•

to prepare a very clear and masterly defense of the purposes and proceedings
of the Hartford Convention, which was published under the title, "Appeal of
Massachusetts Federalists to the Citizens of the United States, dated 28th
January, 1829. n
The Hartford Convention had been attacked principally on the
grounds that it was an unconstitutional body, assembled in secret, to plot
seditious and treasonable action against the Union.
defended it on each point.

Otis in the 'Appeal'

The legality of the Convention he based on the

peoples' right of petition:

...

••• It will not be doubted that the people have a right, "in
an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the
common good," and request of their rulers, "by way of addresses,
petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and
of the grievances they suffer. It This is enumerated in the constitution of Massachusetts among our natural, essential, and unalienable rights ••••
If all the citizens had the right, jointly and severally, ~.o consult tor the common good and to seek tor a redress of their griev
&nces, no reason can be given why their legislative assembly,
which represents them all, may not exercise the same right in
their behalt. 2
The unlikeliness of a secret agreement tor disunion or any other

l~-Ibid::-TR;ply-ot-John-~~ey-Ida;;-to-th;-Lett;r-of-i&;;aeh~ett;-Feder:

aliets, dated 30th December, 1828',50.
2 Ibid., 'Appeal of Massachusetts Federalists to the Citizens of the Unite
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treasonable action, Otis discounts b7 what might seem a rather weak premise:
the fact that the meeting was prepared for openly, attended b7 the fanfare
of the press:
If ••• there had been any secre~ plot for a dismemberment of
the Union, in which it had been desired to engage the neighboring
States, the measures for that purpose, we may suppOse, would have
been conducted in the most private manner possible. On the contrar7, the r.eSGlution of our legislature for appointing their delegates, and prescribing their powers and duties, was Openl7 discussed, and pissed in the usual ma~r; and a COP7 of it was immediately sent, b7 direction of the legislature, to the governor of
ever7 State in the U n i o n . ,
That report - which was published immediately after the adjournment of the convention, and was soon accepted b7 the legislature
-- holds forth the importance of the Union as paramount to all
other considerations •••• l
As a further proof that the efforts of the convention were legal
and loyal, otis emphasized the point that the government of the United
states approved and passed in Congress one of the most important issues
which concerned the New England States -- the power to maintain and organize
state troops, to be paid b7 the national government and used within the
state or in an adjoining state.

"Had this act of Congress passed before the

act of Massachusetts for organizing the convention," declared OtiS, "that
convention never would have ex1sted."2
Otis and his colleagues were luckil7 spared the pain of reading
Adams' reply to this apologia.

His rebuttal was a bitter and persona,t at-

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

States, dated 28th January, 1829,' by Harrison Gray Otis, et al, 81-82.
1 Ibid., 85.
2 Ibid., 86.

;
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tack upon him and upon the convention.
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•

It was written upon Adams' return

to Quincy after having left Washington in what seemed to him disgrace and
the ruin of a valuable career.

He was irritated, too, by the various petty

~t was in a spirit hardly condu.,
cive to genefosity that he wrote the lengthy answer to the New England Fed-

attacks made upon him by his enemies, and

.

<

~

eralists.

On its completion, however, Adams' friends advised him to sup-

press it, filled as it was with bitter

denun~ations

of OtiS, and since als

it would not be salutary to the public good "to revive the memory of Northern schemes of resistance to national authority, at a time when the Union
was staggering under the shock of similar projects in South Carolina and
Georgia."l Says Henry ~s,
He [Adams] suppressed the publication; and it was not long before
the patriotic course of Mr. Otis, at the time of the nullificatio
excitement, led~. Adams to rejoice at t~e suppression, and to
look up?n Mr. Otis with more kindly eyes.
Relating to the suppression of Adams' 'Reply', Morison states,
This course was wise, for the document, though conclusive as
to the existence of a disunion plot in 1804, and an able presentation of the conspiracy theory of the Hartford Convantion, fails
to bring forward a single fact sufficient to justify an impartial
historian in accepting that theory as correct. 3
;

Otis was much elated, however, at Adams I supposed silence, and he
construed this to mean that he had finally vindicated himself and his fello
members of the convention from the charges which had faced them continuousl
since its adjournment, but which never before had come from so high an auth
ority.

It was only in 1877 that Henry Adams at long last felt it possible

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Henry Adams, Preface to Documents Relating to New England l"ederalism, vi
2 Ibid., vii.
3 UOrison, Life and Letters of Harrison Ural Otis, II, 250.
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to release Adams' 'Reply'.

He made this decision upon finding in Henry Ca-

bot Lodge's publication of the Life and Letters of George Cabot, an impart!
treatment of the period, an indication that the old hates had subsided, and
that the editing of Adams t harsh aspersions... Yi9uld not reopen the issue save
in historical circles.

He deleted fraa the manuscript, however, those pas-

sages which were purely a personal attack on Otis and which had no bearing

,..

on historical evidence; yet, as he explains, certain of the passages which
are untouched because ot. their historical value, are equally as damaging to
Otis as those omitted.
John Quincy Adams was convinced that, under the secrecy of the
convention, and in vie. of the hostile attitude of New England to the administration, there certainly existed unlawf'ul designs against the Union.

Con-

cerning the character of the Hartford Convention he wrote,
The Hartford Convention ••••as not a committee of a legislative body discharging merely the duties of making a public report ...
of their doings to the constituents; and the attempt to so represent them can have no other object than to disguise their real
character, which was that of an unconstitutional congress of members from the five New England States, appointed partly by feeble
majorities of three of t he legislatures, and partly by not more
factious county conventions, -- all consisting of the most inveterate adversaries to the administration of the government of the
United States, then struggling with all the difficulties and dangers of a formidable and desolating foreign war.
The tact that the right of petition rested in the people

I

the~

selves, not in a delegation, was not missed by Adams:
[Otis] must not ••• in undertaking to show "the constitutional
right of a State to appoint delegates to such a convention", place
it upon the ground of the constitutional "right of the people to
---------------------------------------------------~------------------------

1 Henry Adams, D2c~ents ftelat~ toNe. Ez:lglAAd Federalism, 'fTO the Citizens of the United States", by ohn ~cy adams, 252.
.
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petition" the government for the redress of grievances. This is a
right reserved by the Constitution of the United States, and by
the Constitution of Massachusetts, to be exercised by the people
in their primitive capacity; and, far from being delegated to the
legislature, cannot be assumed by them without a usurpation of the
right of the people themselves. l
It was the opinion of otis, however.i that the situation necessitat.ed the handling of the petition by delegates rather than by the people themselves, since, as he said, "in the state of distress and danger which then

•

oppressed all hearts, it was to be apprehended ••• that large and frequent
assemblies of the people might lead to measures inconsistent with the peace
and order of the community.n2 He further concluded that if each one of the
states had the right of individual appeal to the central government, surely
several states of the same conviction might "consult together for the same
purpose" ••• and that "the only mode in which they could consult each other
was by a mutual appointment of delegates for that purpose."3
That the convention was a violation of the Constitution, Adams
was convinced.

He based his second argument on this reasoning:

There is another difficulty, too, which Mr. otis must get
over, when he undertakes ••• to defend the lawfulness of that assembly: it is that provision of the United States which, in express
terms prescribes, that "no State shall, without consent of Con;
gress, enter into any agreement or compact with any other State.
Art 1, #10. There is a previous provision, in the same section,
that no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. This, indeed, is positive and unqualified •••• A compact, by
the force of the terms, imports a written engagement. An agreement may be written or verbal, formal or informal. The object of
the ••• Constitution ••• is to forbid them all ••• because every such
agreement or compact to which the Congress representing the whole
Union would not give their consent, must, in its ,nature, strike at
the vitals of the Union itself. Since the existence of the Constitution of the U~ted States, the Hartford Convention is the o~~

----------------------------------------------------------------------------~

1 .B?!s!., 254.
2 Ibid., "Appeal to the
3 l'6Id., 83.

~itizens

of the United States,u by H.G. Otis, 82.
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instance in which this provision has been substantially violated.
A weakness in Otis' defense, which did not pass unnoticed by Adams, was tha
the actual report of the Hartford Convention had much less to do with petition than it did with suggested amendments

~o

the constitution:

Petition for them? No; but elect twelve delegates to go to
Hartford, and there consult ••• with bther representatives from th
other states ••• not about petitioning for redress of grievances,
but about amendments to the Constitution of the United States. 2

•

However ably Adams' repartee disposed of the good intentions of
the delegates at the Hartford Convention, its conclusions were still theoretioal and unproven.

~rison

evaluates his deductions briefly:

Adams' general thesis can be sustained only by the most unfair twisting of the plain meaning of the Report, which threatene
ultimate secession, it is true, in oase the causes of New England
calamities became "radical and permanent. It But no statesman or
party of the ante-bellum period of our history failed at some tim
or other to regard secession as a measure of ultimate resort against sectional oppression. Within five years of the date of
the Hartford Convention, threats of secession were heard from the
Southern Democrats on the floor of Congress; within ten years the
Governor of Kentucky threatened secession if the Supreme Court ~
tempted to enforce its deCisions.)
Henry Cabot Lodge defends, on Adams' own ground, the constitution
ality of the Hartford Convention, as opposed to his charge against it:
If, by the Hartford Convention, certain States entered into
an 'tlgreement or compact, tI they violated the Constitution in so do
ing. But they did nothing of the kind. The delegates were appointed to "conter with each other, and devise means for their
oommon defense." They were to pave the way for a possible future
"agreement or compact," but they were to make none themselves.
The States are not forbidden to conter and offer recommendations
to the several Legislatures, and this has been done in several in
stances by commissioners. Moreover, there must be some binding

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Ibid., liTo the Citizens of the United States," by John Quinoy li-dams,
255-256.
2 Ibid., 254.
) Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 158.
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force in order to make an agreement or. compact, and here there
was none. No State was in any way bound by anything said or done
at Hartford; and this, of itself, shows the non-existence of any
"agreement or compact." The authority intrusted to the President
to call the Convention., together again could not alter the character of the body as at first appointed. They had power merely
to recommend to their several Lf3gislatures, who aight accept or
reject their recommendations as iH!y pleased. The States were at
full liberty to confer. This was all that was done at Hartford,
and the Convention was therefore strictly within the letter of th
.
.
Constitution. l
What the Convention might have beeIf. is an extremely fertile, but
purely speculative, topic.

It might reasonably have led, considering the

condition of the country and its crying need for the full c08peration of
its citizens, to the ready submission of the national government to New
England's demands for their sectional well-being; or it might have sent its
constituents reeling into secession and civil war, at a time when the gove
ment was so hard pressed by the war with Britain.

The possibility of New

England's establishing a separate peace with Great Britain might have cease
to be only a phantom to disrupt the ease of the administration, and have
come a real threat to national security.

It is, of course, impossible to

make any positive conjecture as to what might have occurred had the war not
ended so opportunely, but after a study of the situation, one is inclined
to agree with Henry Cabot Lodge that nothing radical would have been attempted immediately:
That Convention was the exponent of a strong separatist feel
The bare fact of its existence proved the strength of the
separatist forces at work in the community. Yet the men who went
to Hartford used these separatist forces to maintain the Union.
In short, they said plainly to the general government, "unless yo
ing.

-----------------------------------------------------------------.---------

1 Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, 521.
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alter your present policy, a dissolution of the Union ldil ensue. II
They intended to coerce the administration by threatening them
with separation. If their threat was attended to, the Union would
be saved; if not, it is mere conjecture whether the Federalists
would have pushed matters to extremity. They were determined men,
••• and the worst might have been feared •••• yet the policy of the
Convention was one of delay; and they might and probably would, i f
there had been occasion, have prot~cted still further any thing
like open resistance •••• For while the threat of separation is
clearly expressed in the report, and the existence of separatist
feeling is recognized in plain terms, the wish for an immediate
movement in that direction is deprecated and rejected. l

•

Morison, too, defends the Convention's calm but firm handling of the crucial
situation that it was delegated to confer upon:
The Report was an attempt both to satisfy enraged New Englan
and to persuade or frighten the rest of the country into bringing
the war to a close, and treating New England more justly in the
future. It is more noteworthy for what it does not, than for what
it does, recommend •••• [It] was, on the whole, the most temperate
and statemanlike document that ever issued from a sectional movement in the United States.2

1 Ibid., 517-518.
2 IIO'rIson, Life a:nct"'Letters of Harrison Gral otiS, II, 156-159.

I

r

.'

CHAPTER IV
The Fall of the Federalist Party

While the Peace of Ghent was received with wild rejoicing in the
New England states, the post-war concU.tion :e£.;this section of the Union was
anything but salutary.

Whatever vestige or pretense of agriculture New Eng-

land maintained was sadly outclassed by the newly cultivated lands of the

,..

West, and commerce, her mainstay, now faced ruin in the restored intercourse
with Britain.

Her arts of smuggling and piracy had sustained her during the

war, but peace, however welcomed, brought with it the competition of a profusion of cheap articles from long established commercial houses of Great
Britain.

Whereas the war had stimulated •Want industries', its end augur

their ruin, and the next few years saw a migration Dstward of bankrupt New
Englanders.

Politically too, New England was prostrate; as mentioned pre-

viously, the nation as a whole maligned her tor the course she had studious.....
11' followed in opposing the administration in its war policy, and as a consequence New England and its Hartford Convention became the scapegoats of
the post-war reaction.

Connection with the convention or even with Federal-

ism spelled disqualification in national politics, but in state affairs the
political

scene~

at least for the time being, remained unchanged.

In 1816, the Republicans, surprisingly enough, took steps t.? protect the infant industries ot the New England states.

Lynch, in his book

Fifty Years of Party Warfare, says,
The tariff of 1816, while duties were not high, was deliberately framed to give protection to new industries. The Federalist
party had never become interested in a protective tariff polIcy.
In the House, the bill was carried by eighty-eight to fift,-four.
58
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In the Senate, the bill passed by a vote of twenty-five~o seven.
Party lines did not hold in either house, but, among those who voted affirmatively, Republicans far outnumbered Federalists. The re
sponsibility for this first protective tariff must be placed on
Republicans as Federalists were too few to carry any measure. l4ad
ison approved the measure on April 27, 1816.1
This was one of the means employed by the ktAAblicans to secure the control
in the Federalist strongholds -- they accused the Federalist leaders of ever
political crime, and on the side out-federalized Federalism.

They were par-

ticularly interested in securing to themselvel the support of the New Englan
mercantile group:
The Republican Party started out as a combination of agrarian
interest groups, but its leaders realized that its permanent safety required that the mercantile interests be detached from its opponents. To wean away the mercantile interests, the Republicans
abandoned the principles for which they had stood in 1800, reversing themselves and out-federalizing the Federalists. The purchase
of Louisiana, the incorporation of the second Bank of the United
States, and the adoption of a protective tariff following the War
of 1812, were all evidences of the change in party beliefs. This
policy succeeded; and after the election of 1816, the Federalist
Party ceased to be a factor in national politics. Discredited by
its tactics during the War of 1812 and gradually deprived of the
support of the mercantile interests, it had no place in the polit1
cal field and soon died. 2
The state governments in New England, Delaware, and Maryland were
predominantly Federalist at the close of the war, and in New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina they held a powerful minority.

The zeal-

ous efforts of the Democratic propagandistic campaign managed to discredit
Federalism in all these states by 1819, with the exception of Massachusetts,
where Federalists remained at the helm until 1823. 3 But the Federalists con

---------------------------------------------------------------------------William O. Lynch, Fifty Years of Party Warfare (1789~1837) , Babbs-Merrill

1

and Company, IndianapoliS, 1931, 248.
2 Charles W. McKenzie, Party Government in the United States, II, Ronald
Press Company, New York, 1938, 88.
3 liorison, Lite and Letters of Harrison Grax Otis, II, 203.
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tributed to the weakening of their own ranks by a party schism in 1815.
This was probably to be expected in view of the situation in whiCh they were
placed as a result of the Hartford Convention and their attitude toward the
war; those who could not stand the criticism,of the irate country repudiated
the convention and the course of their state during the war and hastened to
ally themselves with the administration; still others refused to back the
national government in any way, opposing its .ery policy; but the majority
of the Federalists followed the course of Harrison Gray Otis and attempted
to restore good feeling in the national family circle, lending support to
government projects, but actively maintaining their own Federalist tenets in
local affairs.
In 1816, then, when the time came for the nomination of a successor to liadison, Otis urged the Federalists, to support Yonroe instead of wasting their votes On Rufus King of New York.

Though they did not follow his

suggestion in 1816, by 1820 Otis managed to secure their corroboration or ...
Monroe's second term.

Gore, writing to. King in 1822, mentioned Otis' part

in influencing the Federalist'vote for the administration:
••• The Gentleman [otis] , to whom your J.etter alludes, did
all in his Power to promote the first Election of Mr. Monroe. Al
though he failed then, at the second choice, he succeeded to insure him a unanimous vote •••• l
King himself was inclined to agree that the only Federalist course was to
join forces with the better half of the Republican group; in l4a.y, 1816, he
wrote to Edward King:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, IV, ed. Charles R. King, '0. Gore
to R. King, June 2, 1822', New York, 1898, 474.
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••• So certain are the Effects of the requisite Arts·of Democracy, and so effectually prostrate is Federalism, that I have no
kind of Expectation, that the latter can again be in Favor.
The course remaining for Federalists, is to adhere to the integrity of their Principles; and they being out of the question as
a rival Party, and the Republicans, so soon as this is understood,
being sure to divide among themselRe.s; the Federalists will be abl
to assist the true interests of Freedom & of Justice, by giving
their influence to the least wicked Section of the Republicans.
Except this service, and it will be a valuable, as well as
disinterested and honest one, I kno~of none, which federalists
can render. l
.
Since few seemed inclined to compete with MonDoe for the presidency, it looked as though the caucus nomination would be practically an election.

The only other outstanding Republican candidate was William H. Craw-

ford of Georgia who also had a considerable following.

When the caucus met

on ldarch 16th, Clay, realizing the unpopularity of the caucus form of llomina
tion, moved that it was "inexpedient" to hold such a nomination.

This moti

was defeated, as was another by John Taylor of New York, that caucus nominations be discontinued.

The result of the balloting was sixty-five votes for

l4onroe as opposed to Crawford's fifty-four.
ceived the nomination for vice-president.

Daniel Tompkins of New York reLynch describes the Federalists'

stand in the election:
While no candidates were officially named by Federalists, it
to be the understanding that Federalist electors should support King for the presidency. This great man qualified as a'candidate to be beaten but he received no notification. No great effort was made to bring about the selection of Federalist electors,
but Massachusetts, Connecticut and Delaware supported King. In
Rhode Island, still a Feder~list state, no contest took place, and
l4onroe electors were named. 2
C81D9

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1
2

Ibid., 'R. King to Edw. King, May 21, 1816', 537.
William O. Lynch, FiftY' Year§ of Party: Warfare (1789-1831), Indianapolis,
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The consensus was that Monroe was as good as elected, so there was little
or nothing to be gained from fighting him.

This was the last time the Fed-

eralists entered a presidential candidate.
The country as a whole was in fav?r of the nominees, but a storm
of disapproval was directed against the method of nomination.

McKenzie

describes the situation as follows:
lteetings were held in JDanY' seo,tions to condemn not so much
the nominations of the caucus but the system of mominations itself. Obviously, the caucus had nearly nominated ,candidates that
the country could not have accepted, for neither Crawford nor
Snyder! was generally popular. But it was equally obvious that
the caucus system was endangering the check and balance system ot
the federal government by making the presidential candidacy depend upon Congress. Moreover, it was clear that the party was re
turning to the Virginia-New York combination and to the Virginia
dynasty, a policy that had been bitterly condemned before and tha
excluded all but one state from the privilege of furnishing a
chief magistrate. Had the protesting elements been able to concentrate their strength upon one candidate, the campaign might
have been a more serious·'one. But effective opposition was not
possible and popular discontent cooled down. 2
The election took place on November 5, 1816, and the votes as
counted the following February 12th totaled:
For PreSident,
James :Monroe, of Virginia
Rufus King, of New York

183
34

For Vice-President,
Daniel D. Tompkins, of New York 183
John E. Howard, of Yaryland
22
James Ross, of Pennsylvania
5
John Marshall of Virginia
4
Robert G. Harper of 1iaryland
3
------------------------------------------------------------------~--------

1 Governor Simon Snyder of Pennsylvania received thirty votes out of 115
cast for nomination of the vice-president.
2 Charles W. McKenzie, Party Government in the United States, New York,
1938, 89.
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Nineteen State s voted, and there was no record of the pOPular
vote. l
McKenzie comments on the .L<'ederalist action in the election:
The Federalist electors divided their vice-presidential vote
among four men, John Howard of llarrland receiving twenty-two vote
Three Federalist electors in MaryLalld and one in Delaware did not
attend the Electoral College and so failed to cast their votes.
The result simply confirmed publically the complete disintegratio
of the Federalist Party.2
Whatever bad feelings had lingered Qn after the War of 1812 were
greatly diminished by a tour of New England which Monroe made in 1817.

Oti

had foraeen the value of such a gesture in consolidating and cementing the
new-found feeling of nationality that had grown ~ut of the years of peace.
Christopher Hughes in a letter to Monroe told him of Otis' conviction of th
good feeling such a tour would produce, and as a consequence Monroe declare
his intention to visit the New England states.

Not since the time of Wash-

ington had a President toured the East, and the citizens awaited the event
with keen anticipation.
preparations.

Both the Federalists and the llemocrats made lavish
....

Otis was nominated as the head of a committee to welcome the

President to Boston, as well as plan for his entertainment during his stay.
The Democrats, decidedly unwilling to let the Federalists have all the glor
appointed a similar committee, planning to intercept the President on the
way and thus frustrate all the elaborate Federalist plans.

Otis, however,

went them one better and met the President's entourage at Providence

~hree

days before it was expected in Boston, delivering the following greeting,

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties, 1789-1905,
ed. Thomas Hudson McAee, Friedenwald Company, .washington, 1906, 18.
2 MMnzie, Party Government in the United States, 90.
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Sir--You are now arrived within the limits of Boston, and ttese
gentlemen are a Committee appointed to welcome your approach, and
escort you to your lodgings. Upon your arrival there, they will
avaU themselves of your permission, to express to you, in a more
formal and respectful mode, than can be done here, the assurances
of the Unfeigned satisfaction which the citizens of Boston realize
in th$ honour you have been pleased to confer upon them by this
visit. l
~ ~;
Having disposed of the amenities, the committee fell in with the
Presidential procession and proceeded to Boston, meeting on the way the rival
Democratic receptionists.

•

In the brief diplomatic skirmish which followed,

the Otis committee won the day because of its official character, and the
crestfallen Democrats returned home out-smarted.

The President proceeded to

his lodgings, where he was more formally welcomed in a speech which drew
flattering comparisons between his visit and that of Washington.

He replied

in kind, and throughout his visit received many evidences of Federalist loy-

alty and respect.

Morison comments on the good feeling the visit provoked,

A few days after the President's departure from Boston, the Centinel made some pleasant comments on his visit under the heading "The
Era of Good Feelings," a phrase that was later applied to the eight·
years of Monroe's administration. Modern historians have objected
to the term as inaccurate. The period of Monroe, they argue, was one
of bad, not good feelings, because the Republican party was breaking
up into personal factions. But the mere fact that James Monroe had
been received with open arms at Boston was sufficient indication that
a great change had been wrought in party relations •••• The party press
apparently had established a truce, except during the month preceeding an election, and even then its tone was calm compared to that of
war time. 2
The presidential campaign of 1$20 resolved itself about three issues,
the Compensation Act which had altered congressmen's salaries from six

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 S. Putnam Waldo, The Tour of James Monroe, President of the United States,
Hartford, 1818, 128.
.
2 Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 209.
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dollars a day to il,500 a year; internal improvements; and last aIfd most important, slavery.

The question of slavery had arisen with the application

of Missouri for statepood, and the decision was thereby forced upon Congress
as to whether or not she might be admitted as a free or a slave state.
;.J.

.oil;

Of

course the issue caused a great deal of debate between North and South, resu! ting in the famous compromise. lLcKenzie describes the situation and Monroe's reaction to it:
No other local issue had caused so much passionate oratory,
so much recrimination, and so much defense. Most of the Northern
representatives of both old parties united in denying Missouri admission as a slave state. Most of the Southern members were equally intent on demanding Missouri's admission as a slave state ••
• •Monroe wisely held aloot from the controversy. Even had he committed himself to one side or the other there is no likelihood
that he would have failed of re'lection. The time was too short
to organize serious opposition to him. As it was, in Pennsylvania
alone was an electoral ticket in opposition to Monroe nominated,
a ticket based upo~ the grounds that Monroe was the candidate of
the slavery party.

In 1820, then, Monroe was re@lected without opposition; no candidates were
presented by the Federalists.

The situation was oddly unsuited for any

or~

ganized campaigning:
The time was not ripe for Clinton, Clay or any other leader
ambitious to become the chief executive to compete with the President. Crawford, who had given Monroe a close r~ce in the congressional caucus of 1816, was content to bide his time in 1820.
There was no need for Republicans to nominate candidates, but General Samuel Smith issued a call for a congressional caucus. Much
opposition developed against such a meeting. Only about fifty
members responded and nothing was done.2
.'
One electoral vote kept the election from being unanimous.

William Plumer

of New Hampshire, not approving of the tactics of Monroe, felt it his duty

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 McKenzie, Party Government in the United States, 90.
2 Lynch, Fifty Years of Party Warfare, 273.
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to cast his vote elsewhere, and as a consequence John

~uincy

Adams, much to
c

. '

his embarrassment, received one electoral vote.
It is interesting to note in the electoral votes of Massachusetts
how the two parties, Federalist and

Repub1~ca.n,
;.J.

had blended:

oil?

After vacancies ~ the Massachusetts Electoral College1' had
been filled, it consisted of eight Federalists and seven Repub1icans •••• A11 15 electors voted for Mr. Monroe but divided on the
Vice Presidency, the 8 Federalist votes going to Mr. Stockton of
New Jersey •••• The total electoral v~e was 231 for Monroe, 1 for
John ~uincy Adams; and 218 for Daniel Tompkins for Vice President.
The other vice-presidential votes were scattered among four men,
the Federalist votes in Massachusetts going for Stockton. 1
The second term of Monroe saw the Federalists lose control of the
state governments in the few places where they still had been uppermost.
Sometimes the Federalists bad it in their power to decide an issue where two
Republicans were fighting it out, but their weakness was becoming increasing
1y evident.

Only in local elections did they present candidates; in state

and national affairs their sun had set.
When it was seen that the Federalists were no longer a JP8nace in

...

national affairs, the Republicans, as had been predicted by Rufus King, bick
ered among themselves.

"Personal, group, and sectional interests," comments
;

McKenzie, "conflicted and the resulting cliques and factions fought for control of the party.

The Era of Good Feeling produced no new party but it per

mitted the development of issues that were to bring about a new al1gnm,ent. 1t2
To return to the State of Massachusetts and Harrison Gray Otis,

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 McKenzie, Party Government in the United States, 91.
2 !e!g., 91.
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Boston in 1821 was finally about to receive a charter qualifying h~r to be
called a city, and Senator Otis was approached with a view to securing his
consent to the nomination for first Mayor.
occasions on which this change had been

Since 1784 there bad been five

urg~,

but the people of Boston had

;p ....

clung to the Jltown-meeting" form of local government.

Upon the recommenda-

tions of a committee of thirteen appointed to study the matter, however, the
Bostonians agreed by popular vote to alter th, now out-moded system.

Otis'

term as senator from Massachusetts was almost over, and discouraged as he
was over the unhappy position in which he was placed as a result of the Hart
ford Convention, he was glad of the opportunity to run for Mayor rather than
to terminate his career in retirement.

Morison, his biographer, is of the

opinion that Otis had hopes of obtaining the governorship at a future date,
and that he may have. regarded the mayoralty as a "convenient stepping-stone"
to that more exalted position.

But unfortunately for the much harried Otis,

there arose in Boston at this time a movement which became known as the 'Middling Interest'.

This faction constituted the "bone and sinew of the party"

mechanics and shopkeepers who banded together against the Federalist party
because they felt themselves ignored when political plums in the forms of offices or nominations were handed out, because their particular interests werE
overlooked, and because there existed in Boston a law against wooden build18gs over ten feet high within the city limits, which restriction irritated
them considerably.
of Washington,

~ote

Otis, noting the tide of opinion even from the distance
hastily to Sullivan to investigate this faction and try

to reassure them, but they werealready too late, and the Middling Interest
proceeded to support Josiah

~uincy

for Mayor.

This was indeed an embarrass-

I
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He had explicitly stated when accepting the nomina-

ing situation for otis.

tion that he wished to compete with no other Federalist who might be put up,
preterring to withdraw and allow him an Wlcontested field.
besting

~uincy

The Federalists,

by five votes (175-170) in the balloting, managed to secure

.

;,J. ...,

the nomination for Otis, but the Quincy tollowers refused to recognize defeat.

The vote was so close that the Middling Interest claimed it was not

binding, while some even went so far. as to de$lare that 'illegal voting' had
secured the nomination.

As a result the Middling Interest acted as a separ-

ate group and nominated the not-unwilling Josiah

~uincy

for mayor.

Needless

to say, the Federalists were angry and alarmed by the unexpected developments, and rather than follow the instruotions of Otis, who as yet knew noth
ing of this outcome, they

g~ded

themselves for the battle, and, to quote

Morison, "there resulted the undignified spectacle of a United States Senator and a distinguished ex-.ember of Congress competing for a mayoralty.nl
Otis was informed of the strange course of events by Thomas Per- ...
kins;
My dear friend,
You will probably have been advised trom your son of the
coune which things have taken here. i.ahti.ncy has thrown himself
into the hands of the "Jtidling or Medling Interest" and has suffer
ed himself to be put up as the Mayor. I had decided upon the
course it was incumbent on me to pursue and went to the caucus,
with the intention of making the declaration which I was bound to
do Wlder your instructions, that is, not to sutter your name to be
put upon the list of Candidates against anyone of the federal pap.
ty who might be started for the Mayoralty. This was however done,
in a manner highly creditable to him, by your son ••••
Your friends'decided that if upon the canvass you had a majop
ity of voices you must be supported by the party. You had the
majority, and you will be voted for on Monday. Harry having made
---------------------------------------------~------------------------------

1 Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 239.
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.'

the declaration in your behalf it leaves you at perfect liberty
to withdraw yourself if you think proper, i f elected -- but which
I hope wlll not be the case. ~cy has done himself up, by the
course he has pursued. If he gets the Mayoralty', his Olm friends
will not suffer him to hold his place on the Bench, with which he
has expressed himself as being partioularly well pleased •••• l

.

However, when the votes were coubt~d neither Otis nor ~oy had
received a majority.
were scattered.

Otis seoured 1,384 votes, and Quinoy 1,736; 580 votes

Both candidates were subsequently withdrawn, and John Phil

•

lips, a l"ederalist who suited the Middling Interest, became first mayor of
Boston by a praotically unanimous vote.
Within a month Otis resigned his seat in the Senate.

This dis-

grace at the polls in his home tOlm humiliated him to suoh a degree that he
felt he could no longer remain in the more exalted position of senator.
But he did not retire for very long, because in 1823 the'Federalists were
looking about for someone to nominate for governor •
. Massachusetts, the stronghold of Federalism, had been oontinuous11' maintaining its perogatives by electing Federalists year after year for
the position of Governor.

The following chart 2 indicated the majorities by

which they secured the elections from the conclusion of the War until the
I

downfall of the party:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Ibid., 'Thomas Handasyd Perkins to OtiS, Boston, April 5, 1822', 251252.
2 Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 240. (Figures up
to 1820 include Maine.)
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Year

Federalist

1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824

Streng
Brooks
II

"
"
"
II

It

otis
Lathrop

Republican
50,921
49,578
46,160
39,538
42,875
31,072
28,608
28,487
30,171
34,210

Dexter
Dearborn
;.J.

.oil;

.

Crowninshie1d
It

Eustis
If

n

•

'I

n

43,938
47,384
38,129
30,041
35,271
21,928
20,268
21,177
34,402
38,650

Brooks would probably have been elected indefinitely had he chose
to run and lived long enough, but in 1822 he reached the age of seventy, an
decided to retire.

otis, who once before had declined nomination for the

governorship now mentioned the wish to be again approached.

The desire to

erase his previous defeat in the elections for mayor prompted Otis to try
for the higher office.

The Federalists were only too glad to gratify him,

in spite of the fact that his losing the mayoralty of Boston might indicate
a turn in the tide of Federalism. as personified by him.

In opposition to

Otis the Republicans nominated the thrice-defeated Dr. William Eustis, a
man who had had a distinguished career as Secretary of War under lIadison,
lLinister to Holland after the War of 1812, and besides had the added distinction of having fought in the Revolutionary War.

Naturally, the f~rst

thing the Republicans did was to vilify the much beleaguered past of poor
etis.

On

this point Morison states,
otis proved to be a vulnerable candidate. He was weal thy,
at a time when lIass8chusetts was already sufficiently democratic
to look on that fact as disqualification for office; he had voted
for Burr in 1801; he was a proprietor of the Charles R~ver Bridge;

I
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.'

he had argued against free primary schools. The Boston Statesman
appealed to tbe orthodox clergy for influence. and votes on the
ground that Otis was a Unitarian, "addicted to habitual profane
swearing, It am because be was "one of the corporation of Harvard
University, which is well known to be devoted to the propagation
of a particular creed, and to have exerted an Ulidue and highly
prejudicial influence to deprees,Q}.her literary institutions, and
other denominations of Christians.· He had invited John Henry,
the British spy, so it was reported, to dine at his house. He
had voted on both sides of the Kissouri question, and his vote
against the Tariff Bill of 1820 sbowed that he was no friend to
domestic manufacture. And most heinous of all, he was a leader
of the treasonable Hartford Conven~onll
So it happened that even in his own state Otis was to hear charges that the
convention which met in her defense was a treasonable and disgraceful mark
on her record, as well as personal dishonor to himself.

~rison

continues,

The term Hartford Convention had no such terrors for the
people of Massachusetts as it had for the rest of the Union.
They knew its history too well to believe the absurd charges
brought up against it, and they had kept the party responsible
for it in power for eight years. But they were unwilling to vote
for a candidate simply to vindicate it •••• The Centinel opened the
campaign, on February 19, with a series of questions and answers
on the Hartford ~onvention; the Federalist Central ~ommittee issued a pamphlet justifying it (Lyman's Short Account); and theFederalist press overflowed with apologetic literature. 2
Otis I supporters wasted too much time vindicating the Hartford
Convention before the people who had supported it, and the opposition so
I'

successfully tore down Otis' career that the belated reminders of his patriotiSJll, how long and hard he had labored as Senator to secure the Massachusetts war Claims, as well as counter-attacks on Eustis, had no avail.
Eustis was elected governor with over 4,000 votes to spare, and Otis,

co~

pletely crushed, went into retirement.
-----------------------------------------~---------------------------------

1 Ibid., 241-242.
2 Ibid., 242-243.
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.
He [Eustis 1 carried not only every county that had ~ver gone
Democratic, but even hide-bound .Essex and Hampden, which thereby
repudiated Federalism for the first time since the original division of parties. l
The victory of Eustis lost their last state to the Federalist party, which then entered into a "period of finwl dissolution".

Eustis added

insult to injury, when, in his inaugural address, he gave a bitter criticiam
of the war policy of the Federalists.

Though Otis was requested to run for

.

governor in 1824, he refused, contenting himself with publishing
ters in Defense of the Hartford Convention and the People of

h~s

"Let-

Massachusett8~

before the election, with appropriate remarks on the tactics of Governor
Eustis.

After ,1824 the Massachusetts Federalists were unable to present

more candidates for governor.
The use of the congressional caucus system was once more attempted
for the nominations in the presidential campaign of 1824.

Sixty-six members

of Congress, out of a total of 261, presented themselves on February 14,.
1824, to take part in the nominations; their selections, on the Republican

ticket, were William H. Crawford of Ueorgia for President, and Albert Gallatin for Vice-President.

To their resolution that these two men be nominate

as the national candidates, they appended this explanation:
In making the foregoing recommendation, the members of this
meeting have acted in their individual characters as citizens;
that they have been induced to this measure from a deep and settled conviction of the importance of the union among liepublicans
throughout the United States, and as the best means of collecting
and concentrating the feelings and wishes of the people of the
Union upon this important subject. 2

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Ibid., 243.
2 Thomas Hudson McKee, National Conv!ptions and Platforms of all Political
Parties, 1789-1905, Washington, 1906, 20.
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Gallatin was chosen to run with Crawford in the hope of strengthelling Crawford t s chances by thus enlisting the support of Pennsylvania.

Unfortunate-

ly for their plans, the question of Gallatin's citizenship was brought up;

...

he had lived in the country since 1780, but. it was held that he had not beel!
in residence when the Constitution was adopted.

Gallatin was therefore co~

pelled to defend himself against this charge throughout the initial campaign, and in the following October he withdr--Iw entirely from the ticket.
In any case his ohances were slight, as Calhoun, who had withdrawn hi. name
from the list of presidential candidates, had been jointly selected by the
'anti-caucus' group for the vice-presidency.

The caucus itself was a fa11-

ure since there eXisted at the time no outstanding parties, and the

presi~

dential campaign became instead a ttpersonal contest ll in which Henry Clay
of Kentucky, J ohn..Nincy Adams of Massachusetts, William H. Crawford of
Georgia, and Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, fought for supremacy.
To add to the general excitement, it was evident that a majority
....
would not be polled for any one of these candidates, and that the final
election would rest with the House of Representatives, to which group only
three of the names could be presented.

The ,,'ederalist position in the cam-

paign was embarrassing:
With their national organization gone and their state machine
rapidly disintegrating, individual Federalists had either to support their fellow citizens, John Quincy Adams, for the pre!ddency
in the fall of 1824, or.haveno party at all •••• Those who were interested in the new manufactures of Massachusetts could overlook
his personal antagonisms and appreciate hi. national position, hi~
agreement with Henry Clay on an "American System" of internal improvements and high tariffs. They were materially interested in
high tariffs. On that account, they could endure the association
with Adams.

I

I
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Other Federalists, however, could not join with A~. Theodore Lyman, Jr., whose father had been intimately associated with
the ~8sex Junto, was a ~ederalist member of the state legislature.
Francis Baylies,of Taunton, Congressman for the Bristol district,
had beenidentified with the Hartford Convention movement. Such
Federalists as these turned away from their former associate., who
were now leaning toward the "national" or conservative wing of the
Republican party, and drew closer... t..;, those Republicans who objecte
to Adams •••• Everything political was in a welter of uncertainty.
No one knew how new party lines would eventually be drawn. Promin
ent individuals, however, began to associate together in oppositio
to their fellow citizen, Adams.l
.

.

Adams was anything but popular as an individual; his demeanor was
cold and not conducive to earning friends.

~esides

the conservative

~'ederal

ist opposition, there also confronted him that of the "old lf Republicans who
favored

~rawford.

These, adhering to the strict construction policy of the

old Jeffersonian Democracy, were opposed to high tariffs and internal 1mprovements; and the southern members of this faction were further alienated
from Adams because he had opposed slavery at the time of the Missouri

Co~

promise.

...

Nevertheless, Adams carried bis own state by an overwhelming major
ity.

Crawford upset the hmpes of his faction by becoming too ill to partici

pate in the election, and, as Darling says, "the issue became simply a ques;

tion of Adams' popularity with his fellow citizens. 1t He continues,
Scareely one-hal.! of those [citizens of MassaChusetts] who ha
voted to the Spring election for governor cast their ballots for
presidential electors in November. If those who stayed awaY.,fava
ed someone else over Adams they did not care enough to go to the
polls. Massachusetts appeared to have abandoned paritisan divisions for the moment to acclaim its illustrious 80n. 2

----------------------------------------------------------

i:--A;~h~;-B~-D~ling, Political CbMges in !assachusetts, 1824-1848, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1925, 41-42.
2

Ibid., 45.
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The elections took place on November 2, 1824, with twenlr","four
states voting.

In six states, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York,

South Carolina and Vermont, the legislature still held the authority to
choose the electors; but in the

oth~r state~

a popular vote was taken, and

the results of this vote are the first recorded for a presidential election
Andrew Jackson, Democrat,
John ~uincy Adams, Coalition,
William H. Crawford, Democrat,
Henry Clay, Republican,
Total,

155,872
105,321
44,282
46,587
352,062

The electoral vote, as counted on February 9, 1825, gave a roajority to no
candidate, and the three names submitted to the House were Andrew Jackson,
who had received 99 electoral votes; John ...nuncy Adams, 84 votes; and V{illam H. Crawford, 41 votes.
votes.

Clay lost mention before the House by only fiv

John Calhoun received the vice-presi4ency by a majority of 182 vote

with his nearest competitor, Nathan Sanford of New York, receiving only 30 •

...

McKee describes the House election:
Accordingly, the same day, February 9, 1825, the Senate

h~v

ing retired, the House immediately proceeded to elect a President

A roll-call showed that ever member of the House except Mr. Garnett, of Virginia, (who was) sick at his lodgings in Washington,
was present. Mr. Webster, of Massachusetts, and ~r. Randolph, of
Virginia, were appointed tellers. The House conducted the election according to the rules already adopted, and on the first bal
lot John Quincy Adams was chosen. The votes of thirteen states
were given to him, those of seven to Jackson, and of four t,o Craw
ford. The Speaker declared Mr~ Adams elected, and notice of the
result was sent to the Senate.~

2

1----------------------~-~----------------~----------------------------McKee, National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties, 21.
2. Defect in the type of MUS.
3 Ibid., 22-23.
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The following table, (Page 77), which indicates the votes of the ~tates, is
especially interesting in view of the charge of a 'dealt between Clay and
Adams.

The accusation was that Clay, defeated in the electoral vote by a

small margin, had it well in his power to

t~

the election by giving his

support to the candidate of his choice, and that knowing this, he l;tad supported Adams to his own personal gain.

Clay was approached by members of

all three factions, but finally chose to side;.with Adams, and though the

House, after careful investigation, found no evidenoe of a deal, yet the accusation was strengthened by Adams' appointment of Clay to the position of
Secretary of State.
The possibility of collusion between Adams and Clay, however circumstantial, yet supplied the opposition with an abundance of fuel for the
next campaign.

Jackson himself stated three years later that a Congressman

of Clay's fae tion had told him of the arrangement, offering him Clay's support on the same terms.

Mch.enzie gives an interesting analysis of the

si~

ation:
A comparison of the votes in the Electoral College with those
in the House of hepresentatives shows some interesting facts.
Where Adams had carried only the electoral votes of New England
and divided those of New York, Delaware, Maryland, LouiSiana, and
Illinois, he obtained the three Clay States of Kentucky, Missouri
and Ohio, and the Jackson States of Maryland and Louisiana in the
House vote. And unquestionably the Clay influence gave him the
vote of l~ew York. Where Crawford had carried the electoral vote
of only two States, Georgia and Virginia, and had divided the
votes of Delaware, l4aryland, and New York, he kept Georgia and
Virginia in the House, carried Delaware clearly, and won North
Carolina away from Jackson. Where Jackson had had a plurality in
the electoral vote, he now was in second place in the House vote,
with Adams, second in the Electoral College, elected President.
It looked like a deal. And because it looked like a deal Adams
was doomed to defeat four years later, for Jackson's friends were
aroused. The new democracy of the West was to speak in protest

I
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t

•

Andw.
Jackson

J. Q.
Adams

STATES
Alabama
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Mississippi
Missouri
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
Total

Wm. H.
Crawford

3

6

1
7

;p '""?

1

3
8
2
7

5
12
1
6
1
18

1
10,
1

2

4
1

'"

3

1

1
1

5
2
2
2

14
10
2

25

9
9
5
1

1

12

87

71

54

During this period Congress was politically divided as follows: l
Nineteenth Congress
Senate -~ 38 Democrats, 10 Whigs - - - - - - - - - - Total, 48
House - 79 Federalists, 134 ,Democrats - - -' - - " , 213 ,Twentieth Congress
Senate -- 37 Democrats, 11 Whigs - - - - - - - - - - Total, 48
House -:- 85 Federalists, 128 Democrats - - - - - " , 213

1 Ibid., 23-24.
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against East~rn domination and deals. It began speaking as soon
as the House vote was announced; it continued to speak tor many
years after ~dams was deteated tor re8lection and Jackson had assumed the Pr.esidency.l
.
Thu~,

trom tlbe moment Adams received the presidency in 1825, the

bitter campaign ot 1828 was launched to obt.aj,n his downfall.

nNo story, It

says McKenzie, Itwas too preposterous if it could make votes against Adams."
Jackson was immediatellF nominated tor the presidency (October, 1825) by the

•

legislature ot Tennessege; this action was prompted by Jackson's declaration
that he was in tavor

a

o~

constitutional amendment which would place the

election ot the preside.nt directly into the hands ot the people.

According-

ly, Jackson resigned hLs seat in the Senate and the campaign began in "&mest, with the avowed

~pose

to avenge the hero of New Orleans for what his

supporters considered a.::n unfair defeat at the hands of Adams.
Adams was at

.A

disadvantage from the first.

He had difficulty in

reassuring the differen-t factions which had supported him,
obstacle of the barrage
stepped into office.

b~sides

the added

of propaganda hurled at him from the moment that

lie

L:=rnch describes his predicament:

Adams ne~ded and received the aid of certain Federalists in
the House whe~ chosen President, but it is doubtful whether the
Federalist co~tingent in the Adams party proved to be an asset or
a liability.
It is certain that Adams wished his Administration
to be regardec:i as Republican. He had assured Webster and ~art!eld
that he would not proscribe Federalists should he become President
but he had no intention ot giving prominence to the members of the
party from whLch he had sf'parated in 1808 •••• The Federalist's of
New Hampshire were anxious to support the Administrati~n but they
found the Pre. . ident to be cold and unresponsive. The Republicans
of that state who joined the Adams party, including Governor John
Bell, feared t-he effects of an alliance with the Federalists.
Each section 0--£ the party ot Jefferson wished to retain the character and nam. . of the Republican party. Webster sadly told Adams,
-----------------------~-------------~----------------------------------~--

1 ~cKenzie, Party Gover=?Qment in the United States, 96-97.
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that "each kept up the same tone of hostility toward the 4f ederalists as in the days when there was a Federal Party.l
In 1828, then, the political parties took on a definite character
which was to identify them throughout several subsequent presidential elections.

The Democrats nominated Andrew Jackso.for President and John Cal-

houn for Vice-President;. the National Republican Party (later the Whig Papty) supported John ~uincy Adams for re81ection, and Richard Rush of Penneyl
vania for vice-president.

Lynch regards this

~hQioe

of Rush as a definite

mistake on the part of the Adams faction, since the prospective southern
vote was thus alienated by the nomination of two men from non-slaveholding
states:
It is true that both Jackson and Calhoun were from the South
each had a large degree of popularity in the North while the
same cannot be asserted ~f either Adams or Rush in regard to the
South. Of the western states wl1.ofe House delegations helped to
make Adams President in 1825, evety one chose Jackson electors in
1828. Not even Kentucky, Clay's own state, stood by the Administration. 2
bu~

The Federalists and the Hartford Convention were again berated
abused in this campaign of 1828.

Both sides decried affiliation with them,

and both sides likewise accused the other of alliance, secret or otherwise,
with the traitors.
The Federalists played in this contest the unhappy role of
scapegoats, the ownership of which each side attempted to force
upon the other. The Boston Statesmen, a typical blackguarding
Jackson sheet, supported by the hungry office-seeking element in
the Democratic party, attempted to prove that John ~cy Adams
was a Hartford Convention Federalist in disguise, and that his
candidacy was a Federalist plot to revive the "reign of terror"

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Lynch, Fifty Years of Party Warfare, 352-353.
2 Ibid., 355.
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of the elder Adams. During the month before election day its
pages became fairly spotted with "Hartford Convention" in italics
and capitals. At the same time the Statesman had for,its only
ally in the Boston press the Jackson Republican, which was founded and edited by Theodore Lyman, ,Jr., a great-nephew of Timothy
Pickering, and author of the Sbott Account of the Hartford Ccmven
tion •••• lt is needless to saythat.in its pages all references to
the Hartford Convention are carefUliy avoided. The conservative
Adams press in Boston, remembering its past, was also tender of
old Federalist issues until a week before the election, when the
President forced its hand. On October 29 he published in the ~
tional Intelligencer, in reply to certain imputations against his
motives for deserting Federalism, tHat in 1808 the object of
l4assachusetts Federalist leaders "was , and had been for several
years a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confederation. It Boston was still gasping for breath over
this startling announcement when it learned that Daniel Webster,
one of .il.dams' most eminent supporters, was about to bring a libel
suit against Theodore Lyman for casually mentioning him in the
Jackson Republican as one of the former Federalist leaders whom
the President intended to impugn.
A more complicated political situation it would be difficult
to imagine. One Jackson paper was accusing Adams of Federalism;
Adams was charging the Federalists with treason, and an Adams
Federalist was suing,a Jackson Federalist for implying that he
was among the traitors.l
This unexpected action on the part of Adams 'so aroused the Feder.
alists of MassaChusetts that they withdrew their support from his party and
nominated instead their own ticket, naming otis and Prescott as their
choice.

This resulted in a meager response of 156 votes which were secured

only in Boston.

In spite of his last minute charge, Adams obtained the

majority vote in his state, only to lose to Jackson in the final accounting
"

The election took place on November 4, 1828, with twenty-four
states voting; only in South Carolina were the electors selected by the
legislature.

The popular vote accorded to Jackson 647,2)1 votes, as

to Adams' 509,097.

oppo~

Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray otis, II, 247-248.
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New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont gave their full quota of electoral
votes to Adams and Rush; while liaine, Maryland, and New York were divided.
Jackson received 178 electoral votes in all; Adams, 83.
vice-presidency with 171 electoral

vote~j.as
.~

Calhoun took the

opposed to Rush's 83, Georgia

having delegated seven votes for this office to William Smith of South Ca
lina.
During this period Congress was ~olitically divided as follows: l

Twenty-First Congress
Senate -- 38 Democrats, 10 Whigs - - - - - - - - Total, 48
House -- 142 Democrats, 71 Vihigs - - - - - - - " , 213
Twenty-Second Congress
Senate -- 35 Democrats, 13 "Mihigs - - - - - - - - Total, 48
House - 130 Democrats, 83 rlhigs - - - - - - - " , 213
Thus, with the elimination of the ,It'ederUists in the twenty-first
Congress, the once illustrious party lost every vestige of organization and

".

became a legend, to be recalled when derogatory material was needed in election campaigning.

The Federal Party had lost control of state affairs

in 1825; in local interests it had held on until,its extinction in 1827.
But the eleventh hour ticket of presidential electors in 1828, headed by
Otis, was, as Morison affirms, "the last ticket ever voted for that bore
the name of the once powerful party of Washington and Hamilton."2 ~he Hart
ford Convention, called to rescue the New ~gland states from national oppression, had resulted instead in the ruin and condemnation of the outstand
ing and powerful party which controlled their affairs.

Not even the grad-

ual. blending of the Federalists into the parties of the day saved them from

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 McKee, National Conventions and Platform§ gf
2 llerison, Life and Letters of Harr'so

All

Political Parties, 26.
, II, 248.
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occasional blasts of criticism for their supposed treason in 18t5.

Their

existence was thus commemorated, however negatively, for some years, and
the National Republican (Whig) Party which t,hey had joined during Adams'
administration, received liberal and repea~ed attacks for harboring 'Hartford Convention Federalists.'
Even in 1942, one hundred and twelJ,ty-seven years later, the cry
"Hartford I,;onvention" still rings in Easte~ ears.

Rebuked by Major Karl

Detzer of the office of the undersecretary 01 war, for their hysterical
fears that Chicago was half-heartedly supporting World War II, an editorial
from the maligned city retorted:

Maj. Detzer should tell the people of the east that in the
west there never was anything res~bling a Hartford convention to
consider secession of the eastern _tates from the Union, at the
very time the nation was fighting .,he War of 1812. 1

---------------------------------------------'------------------------------

1

Chicago Sunday Tribune, "The Slave of the Lamp", May 31, 1942, I, 10 •.

Mo
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